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Introduction 
"The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" has been an interest of mine since I first visited 
Sichuan Province, China in 1990. There I happened to make friends with Chinese people 
who were involved in the Cultural Revolution as university students. One woman, in her late 
thirties, was an interpreter of Japanese at the Provincial government. Because she was very 
keen to learn about anything she was interested in, I once told her that I was very impressed 
with her. She replied, "I'm studying hard now, because I couldn't do so when I was a 
teenager." Then she said to me that it was all because of the "Cultural Revolution." Although 
I had heard the words "Cultural Revolution" before, I did not know about it in detail. Until 
then, to me, the "Cultural Revolution" was a historical event which no longer existed. I also 
became friends with people whose parents and relatives were still suffering from the mental 
damage that they received during the Revolution period. Their stories made me think about 
what the Cultural Revolution was. 
I taught Japanese to Chinese middle-school teachers of English 1n the Sichuan 
Education Institute (Sichuan Jiaoyu Xueyuan ). Some of my students visited me often to 
complain about how hopeless their future in their country was. It seemed to me as if they 
had no nationalistic sentiments. I thought that it might have been because it was just after the 
Tiananmen Incident in 1989. 
Then I came to woncier about what Chinese nationalism was during the Cultural 
Revolution. I thought the Chinese people's nationalistic sentiment of that period might in 
some ways affect that of today. However, to know the nationalistic feelings of all of the vast 
number of Chinese individuals during the Revolution period is impossible. As I was 
wondering how I could satisfy my curiosity, I came to be interested in China's image of its 
international status and role during the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, my supervisor 
suggested to me that in order to observe Chinese nationalism during the Cultural Revolution 
period and the preceding years, I should examine what was being said in print by Chinese 
1 
people at the time and how the various voices in Chinese media (both official and non-
official ones) expressed themselves about China's place in the world. By doing this, he said, 
I could not only see Chinese nationalist self-images of this period, but also find enough raw 
materials for the research. The ref ore I decided to look at the rhetoric of Chinese nationalism 
in the 1960s, including the early phase of the Cultural Revolution. 
I will refer briefly here to the early situation of the Cultural Revolution. I Lin Biao, 
the then Defence Minister of China, said that the Cultural Revolution (formally, the "Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution") aimed to develop proletarian ideology and the socialist 
system in accordance with Mao Zedong Thought, and to throw out bourgeois ideology and 
"revisionism. "2 It has been interpreted as a CCP Maoists' attempt to attack CCP "realists" 
who were claimed by the Maoists to be "revisionists." In the early stage of the Revolution 
(1966-68), radical activities of Red Guards, young Maoists , were significant throughout the 
whole country. They "analysed" Mao Zedong Thought and criticised "capitalists," 
"revisionists " and other "counterrevolutionaries" harshly. Their activities sometimes 
developed into violence. 
Chinese nationalism in the 1960s has not often been closely examined from the 
perspective of the rhetoric of Chinese revolutionary propaganda. By contrast, much analysis 
has been done from the point of view of how China acted. 3 Many researchers claimed that 
during the Cultural Revolution China concentrated instead on internal aff-airs.4 However, it 
was also true that China, as a "revolutionary" and "proletarian'1 country, always cared about 
how it would look abroad and its place in the world. For example, Chinese Maoists 
repeatedly argued that the urevisionist" leaders (such as Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi) 
1 Although there are several different ways of defining when the Cultural Revolution started, it is a common 
understanding that the Revolution began in 1966 and ended in 1976. 
2
'Comrade Lin Piao's speech--At Peking's mass rally celebrating the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' 
in PR No.35, 26 August 1966, p.8. 
3For example, Van Ness, Peter, Revolution and Chinese foreign policy--Peking's support for wars of 
national liberation (University of California Press, London, 1970), pp.77-197., and Bamouin, Barbara and 
Yu Changgen, Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution (Kegan Paul International, London, 
1998), pp.66-115. 
4For example, Jonathan Unger (ed.), Chinese Nationalism (M.E.Sharpe, Inc., New York, 1996), p.xii. 
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"disgraced" the Chinese people through their friendly diplomacy with "reactionaries" during 
their trip to Indonesia in 1965. 5 
I will attempt to analyse nationalist and revolutionary expressions by Maoists in the 
Chinese Communist Party and by Red Guards as regards China's image and status in the 
world in the 1960s. By doing so I want to discuss Chinese points of view on their place in 
the world. Furthermore, I will demonstrate the influence of the CCP nationalist concern with 
improving China's international image with rhetorical strategies. I will look at revolutionary 
propaganda in official and non-official Chinese newspapers (such as Renmin Ribao and 
Red Guard newspapers, respectively) and magazines (such as Hongqi) to examine Chinese 
rhetorical strategies. 
The then Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, exerted great 
personal power over the Cultural Revolution. John W. Lewis insists that Mao "subsumed 
his image under the party and lent it his authority. "6 (It can be said that the CCP also used 
Mao's image for improvement of the Party image.) Indeed, whatever his intentions were, the 
' 
image of Mao in Chinese publications rose dramatically and he was often referred to as the 
great leader not only of the Chinese people, but also of the revolutionary peoples of the 
world. This image coincided with China's self-image on the international stage; China "was 
the red fortress of the revolutionary peoples of the world. "7 My hypothesis is that in 
revolutionary China in the 1960s, the rise of nationalism was stronger than enthusiasm for 
world revolution. It can be said that Chinese people, as they themselves claimed, tried to 
pursue the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle in a Marxist-Leninist way, but also that this 
was in order to build up the country's international image. 
This research will focus only on the rhetoric of how Chinese Maoists tried to place 
China in the world. Even though Chinese foreign policy will be referred to in order to 
support the discussion, Chinese foreign policy itself is not the subject of this thesis. The 
5 
'Yinni fandong pai mianqian de pa sigui [Cowardly ghosts in front of the Indonesian reactionary clique]' in 
Waishi Fenglei, 14 July 1967, in RGP Vol.13, p.4394. 
6Lewis, John W., 'Leader, commissar, and bureaucrat: the Chinese political system in the last days of the 
revolution' in Ho, Ping-ti and Tang Tsou (eds.), China in crisis, Vol.1, Book 2 (The University of Chicago 
Press , Chicago, 1968), p.465. 
7 
'Beijing shi shijie geming renmin de hongse baolei [Beijing is the red fortress of the revolutionary peoples 
of the world]' in RMRB, 6 May 1967, p.5. 
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main international matters which will be included in this study are; Sino-Indian boundary 
confrontations (1962); the Sino-Soviet conflict (1963-); escalation of the Vietnam War 
(1965); establishment of diplomatic relations with France (1965); the split between the CCP 
and the Japanese Communist Party ( 1966); and Chinese riots against the British authorities 
over Hong Kong matters (1967). 
I will mainly look at two Chinese official publications; Renmin Ribao and Peking 
Review. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) was and still is the organ of the Chinese 
Communist Party. Peking Review (now titled Beijing Review) is a weekly magazine in 
English, published under the direction of the CCP. Peking Review often carries English 
versions of Renmin Ribao articles ( especially editorials) mainly over international matters. It 
shows CCP points of view on external affairs to the rest of the world. Another Chinese 
official media source which I will use in this study is Hongqi (Red Flag). Although 
publication of the magazine was suspended from December 1967 to July 1968 (when the 
Cultural Revolution reached its peak), Hongqi has been the most important theoretical 
magazine of the CCP. 8 
All the Red Guard publications I will look at are Beijing-based. They are; 
Dongfanghong (The East is Red); Hongqi (Red Flag); Hongwei Zhanbao (Red Guard 
War Bulletin); Hongweibao (Red Guard News); Waishi Fenglei (Foreign Affairs 
Storms); Waishi Hongqi (Foreign Affairs Red Flag); Pi Chen Zhanbao__ (Anti-Chen War 
Bulletin <Chen=Foreign Minister Chen Yi>); Renda Sanhong (People's University's 
Three Reds) (combined issues with Xin Beida); and Shoudu Hongweibing (Capital Red 
Guard); Xin Beida (New Beijing University). 
8During the suspension, Hongqi collaborated with Renmin Ribao and Jiefang Junbao (Liberation Army 
Daily) . 
4 
Brief history of Sino-Soviet disputes 
But before examining the rhetoric of the 1960s it is necessary to summarise very briefly how 
China's international policies developed in the 1960s, especially the increasingly hostile 
relationship with the USSR. 
The Chinese Communist Party showed an increasing distrust of the Khrushchev-led 
USSR over the anti-imperialist struggle from the late 1950s onwards. In 1956, Khrushchev 
made a de-Stalinisation speech, which gave an unsatisfactory impression to Mao and other 
CCP leaders.9 In 1957, Mao visited Moscow and praised the Soviet Union as the leader of 
the socialist camp, while skilfully putting pressure on Khrushchev not to emphasise a 
peaceful line towards imperialism.1 o The Soviet Union unilaterally withdrew Soviet 
technicians and researchers from China in mid 1960.11 However, no significant hostility 
was openly revealed between the two parties at the beginning of the 1960s. 
In 1961, the president of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, Song Qingling, 
sent quite a friendly message on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet 
Treaty: 
The Soviet people have given China great help in all fields in the past 11 years 
[ ... ]. Such assistance will never be forgotten by the Chinese people [ ... ]. We are 
extremely glad to see that the great Soviet people, under the leadership __ of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union headed by 
Comrade Khrushchov, are building communism with all their efforts.12 
Moreover, Renmin Ribao praised the Sino-Soviet treaty extensively in February 1962.13 
But, on the other hand, Zhou Enlai, at the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress on 19 
October 1961, implicitly criticised the Soviet Union for "unilaterally disturbing the solidarity 
9Uno, Shigeaki, Koji Kobayashi and Susumu Yabuki (eds.), Gendai Chugoku no rekishi 1949-1985 [The 
history of contemporary China] (Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1986), p.132. 
10Ibid., pp.134-135. 
11 Camilleri, Joseph, Chinese foreign policy--the Maoist era and its aftermath (Martin 
Robertson&Company Ltd., Oxford, 1980), p.53. 
12
'Soong Ching-ling greets Sino-Soviet Treaty Anniversary' in Survey No.2441, 21 February i961, p.28. 
13
'Shoudu relie qingzhu Zhongsu tongmeng shier zhounian [The capital (of China) warmly celebrates the 
twelfth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty]' in RMRB, 14 February 1962, p. l. 
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of the fraternal parties" by the mid 1960's withdrawal of Soviet support for Chinese military 
development. After praising the CPSU for successfully building communism, Zhou stated: 
We hold that should a dispute or difference unfortunately arise between fraternal 
Parties or fraternal countries, it should be resolved patiently in the spirit of 
proletarian internationalism and on the principles of equality and unanimity 
through consultation. Any public, onesided censure of any fraternal Party does 
not help unity and is not helpful to resolving problems. To bring a dispute 
between fraternal Parties or fraternal countries into the open in the face of the 
enemy cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist attitude. Such an attitude 
will only grieve those near and dear to us and gladden our enemies. 14 
Furthermore, the CCP expressed critical opinions about the Soviet attitude during the Cuban 
missile crisis of October 1962, when the USSR installed missiles in Cuba and withdrew 
them because of confrontation with US President Kennedy .1 s The absence of strong 
support from the USSR over the clash over the Sino-Indian border in the same month also 
made the Chinese leaders suspicious about the Soviet leadership in the socialist camp. As 
will be demonstrated, the Chinese government hoped that the Soviet Union would show 
more hostility towards the United States. After a series of denunciations of China about its 
"warlike" character by the Soviet Union in 1962, Mao clearly showed his decision that 
China would part from the USSR over the international communist movement.16 Chinese 
frustration at what was called the "revisionist policy" of the Soviet leaders boiled over and 
Chinese hostility towards the CPSU was finally unveiled. 
In the open polemics between Maoist China and the Khrushchev-led USSR from 
1963 to 1964, China thoroughly denounced the USSR as revisionist because it sought for 
"peaceful coexistence" with the United States. China insisted on a firm Marxist-Leninist 
policy over anti-imperialism and proletarian internationalism. Therefore, to China, "peaceful 
14
'Chou En-lai's speech at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union' in PR No.43, 
27 October 1961 
15uno, Kobayashi and Yabuki (eds.), p.232. 
16camilleri, p.66. 
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coexistence" with the imperialist United States would be impossible. However, at this stage, 
China still expressed the hope that the CPSU leaders might correct their "mistakes": 
We have already warned you that the day you call a schismatic meeting will be 
the day you step into your grave. [ ... ]. At this critical juncture, we hope you 
will weigh the pros and cons and choose carefully between continuing on the 
road to doom and turning back to safety. 1 7 
Chinese hostility to the Soviet Union continued to mcrease after the sen es of Chinese 
comments on the Soviet letters18 ended in mid 1964, followed by Khrushchev's resignation 
from the Central Committee of the CPSU in October. China regarded Soviet revisionism 
under Khrushchev as "the main danger to the international communist movement today." 19 
China's success in developing nuclear weapons in October 1964 clearly signified that 
China had become independent of Soviet aid. The CCP's intention to "be free from the 
dominance of outside powers "20 was achieved. 
In 1965, at a time when US involvement in Vietnam was increasing, China rejected 
the Soviet call for united action by all the communist parties against "imperialism, 
colonialism and neocolonialism. "21 One of the reasons the CCP did not unite with the 
CPSU to oppose US imperialism in Vietnam was because the CCP by that time regarded the 
CPSU leaders as "revisionists" who would be fighting US imperialism for their own 
interests, but not for the people. Also, the CCP maintained a negative attitude towards Soviet 
participation in the Second Afro-Asian Conference that was supposed to be held in that year. 
Moreover, the Maoists never compromised on forming an alliance with the USSR over 
17
'C.P.C. Central Committee's reply to the C.P.S.U. Central Committee's letter of July 30, 1964' in PR 
No.36, 4 September 1964, p.7. 
18There were open polemics over the international communist line between the Central Committee of the 
CCP and the Central Committee of the CPSU from September 1963 to July 1964. Editorial Departments of 
Renmin Ribao and Hongqi printed the CCP's comments on nine open letters of the CPSU. See English 
versions of the nine comments in PR No.37 (13 September 1963), No.38 (20 September 1963), No.43 (25 
October 1963), No.47 (22 November 1963), No.51 (20 December 1963), No.6 (7 Feburary 1964), No.14 (3 
April 1964) and No.29 (17 July 1964). 
19'Unite under the banner of the great October Revolution' in PR No.46, 13 November 1964, p.16. 
20Sutter, Robert G., Chinese foreign policy after the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1977 (Westview Press, 
Colorado, 1978), p.3. 
21
'Unity of action is an imperative requirement of the anti-imperialist struggle' in Pravda, 20 June 1965, 
quoted in Gittings, John, Survey of the Sino-Soviet dispute--a commentary and extracts from the recent 
polemics 1963-1967 (Oxford University Press, London, 1968), p.238. 
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support for North Vietnam, even though the Soviet Union, in June 1965, insisted that "all 
the socialist countries and the entire world Communist movement must rally and co-operate 
in the cause of supporting the Vietnamese people. "22 
Sino-Soviet relationships continued to deteriorate. In 1966 China expelled all Soviet 
students and government officers. 23 During the Cultural Revolution Soviet revisionism was 
the main external target of Maoist criticism (the main internal target consisted of "capitalist 
roaders," such as Liu Shaoqi, who was claimed by Maoists to be connected to international 
revisionism). The Maoists' stubborn attitude towards Soviet revisionism exacerbated 
China's isolated situation in the world. For example, the Japanese Communist Party, the 
CCP's long-term friend, insisted on an international united front including the USSR against 
the United States in Vietnam, but failed to persuade the Maoists and parted from the CCP on 
the anti-imperialist struggle in early 1966. 
China's relations with the rest of the world were seriously disrupted from 1967 to 
1968. The extremism of Chinese diplomacy when it was briefly controlled by radical 
Maoists caused a disastrous situation for China. The burning of the U .K. mission and the 
violence towards the British Charge d'Affaires in Beijing by Red Guards in August 1967 
could not be controlled even by the Maoist leaders in the C CP. 24 Red Guards and other 
"rebel" organisations broke down the rigid control of foreign policy hitherto exercised by the 
Party and the state. Divergent views on Chinese foreign policy were fo_r a while openly 
expressed in the unofficial press. 
Even though this research does not extend to matters after 1968, it is important to 
refer briefly to the Sino-Soviet boundary clash in 1969 in order to observe China's policy 
towards Soviet affairs in the 1960s. 
22rbid., p.256. 
23 Ellison, Herbert J., The Sino-Soviet Conflict--a global perspective (The University of Washington Press, 
Seattle, 1982), p.xviii. 
24 Gurtov, Melvin, 'The foreign ministry and foreign affairs in the Chinese cultural revolution' in Robinson , 
Thomas W. (ed.), The cultural revolution in China (University of California Press, California, 1971), p.351. 
and Cradock, Percy, Experiences of China (John Murray, London, 1994), pp.72-73. 
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The tension over the Sino-Soviet boundary rose dramatically when the USSR began 
strengthening its military forces along the Chinese border in 1965.25 The Chinese media 
reported that more than four thousand incidents occurred along the border from October 
1964 to March 1969, and it was March 1969 when heavily reported military clashes between 
the two countries took place. 26 The armed invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union 
in the summer of 1968 caused a severe shock to Chinese leaders. China became anxious 
about the possibility of a similar invasion of China by Soviet military forces. 27 Meanwhile, 
China never relaxed its hostility towards the Soviet Union. National security became one of 
the most important issues for China in 1969. 
Thus I will look at Chinese propaganda with reference to China's relation with the 
Soviet Union and the importance of national security in the 1960s. 
25 Bamett, A. Doak, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (The Brookings Institution, Washington, 
D.C., 1977), pp.48-49. 
26Bamouin and Yu, p.86. 
27 Camilleri, p.123. 
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Chapter One: 
Anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism 
1.1. Verbal attacks towards enemies and verbal encouragement 
towards allies 
China's revolutionary propaganda became extreme in the 1960s. Criticism of the United 
States and the Soviet Union was the main subject of Chinese propaganda concerning the 
international struggle against imperialism. "Imperialism" is the policy of aggression by a 
state which seeks more capital abroad. In the 1960s, the United States was regarded by 
communist and socialist organisations and countries as the biggest imperialist power in the 
world. Even though imperialism was always claimed to be the basic enemy of the people of 
the world, revisionism, represented by the USSR, was also seen as a major enemy to be 
defeated. "Revisionism" is betrayal against Marxism-Leninism. According to the CCP, 
imperialism and revisionism were mutually dependent: 
The Kosygin-Johnson talks marked the beginning of a new period of us.:soviet 
collusion in which the Soviet revisionists will throw themselves completely at 
the feet of US imperialists and play a secondary role in the counter-revolutionary 
"holy alliance" dominated by the Unites States.28 
In their desperate convulsions, the imperialists headed by the United States are 
pinning their last hopes on modern revisionism.29 
China's verbal strategy developed criticism against US imperialism as their mam 
focus in the first half of the 1960s. The rest of the world was divided in the Chinese view 
28
'Jen-min Jih-pao observer on Hollybush betrayal' from RMRB , 'Big betrayal at Hollybush', 3 July 1967, 
from Xinhua, 3 July 1967, in Survey No.3974, 6 July 1967, p.36. 
29'Marching forward together under the banner of Marxism-Leninism' in PR No.16, 19 April 196 , p.18. 
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into enemies and friends. Not only those who were anti-communist, but also those who 
opposed the CCP over US imperialism or Soviet revisionism were regarded by China as 
enemies. On the other hand, all the oppressed people of the world were considered to be 
friends of China--even if their leaders were aligned with Moscow. In addition, those 
governments which were neither pro-US nor pro-USSR also received warm encouragement 
from the CCP. 
This section will firstly observe criticism against the "enemies" of "world 
revolution," mainly the United States and the Soviet Union. (Chinese denunciations of the 
USSR began in the mid 1960s.) Through this criticism I wish to examine the Chinese points 
of view on imperialism and revisionism and on its relations with them. Then I will look at 
China's verbal support for its friends, in order to analyse Chinese attempts at protecting 
itself from isolation on the international stage. 
Imperialism was verbally attacked quite often as the "common enemy of the people of 
the whole world. "30 The CCP's aim to maintain this criticism was to make the imperialists 
isolated on the international stage. The CCP claimed that the imperialists were to be smashed 
because they wouldn't change their chara.cter. 31 The CCP announced in May 1962: 
Together with the other peoples of Asia and the rest of the world, the Chinese 
people will eventually settle accounts with the U.S. aggressors for the blood 
they have spilt. 3 2 
Song Qingling, then Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic of China, gave a 
lecture in Ceylon in early 1964. She defined imperialism as the biggest "obstacle" in 
establishing world peace: 
[Imperialism] is still the most vicious enemy of man's progress and the sole 
source of war in the world today.33 
But she insisted that China was reluctant to be warlike: 
30
'Mao Zedong zhuxi guanyu zhichi Gongguo (Li) renmin fandui Meiguo qinltie de shengming [Chairman 
Mao Zedong's statement on support for Congolese (Leopoldville) people's opposition toward US aggression]' 
from Xinhua, 28 November 1964, in HQ No.23,24, 1964, p.2. 
3 l For example, 'Kennidi de da yinmou [Kennedy's big plot]' in RMRB, 21 June 1963, p.3. 
32'Serious warning to U.S. aggressors' in PR No.18, 4 May 1962, p.14. 
33
'United, the people are invincible' by Song Qingling, 28 February 1964, in PR No.IO, 6 March 1964, 
p.10. 
1 1 
(The imperialists) have tried to turn China's unwavering stand for peace and its 
willingness to settle all problems by means of negotiation on the basis of 
principle, into a warlike stance [ ... ]. 34 
This was far from the image of the warlike Chinese depicted in a lot of CCP anti-imperialist 
propaganda (discussed below). It seems that she tried not to give a warlike image of China 
to "Third World" "allies." As will be demonstrated in Chapter Three, Chinese leaders were 
trying to present both militant and peaceful images of China to the rest of the world. 
Critiques of imperialism were sometimes associated with critiques of racism. Mao 
Zedong criticised US imperialism for racial discrimination in August 1963. Mao insisted that 
"fascist assaults" on black people revealed "reactionary" internal policy and the "aggressive" 
diplomacy of the US govemment.35 He also defined "ethnic struggle (minzu douzheng)" as 
one kind of "class struggle. "36 When the statement was published in 1963, Beijing was 
trying to establish diplomatic relations with many African countries which had been newly 
decolonised. It was the right time for Mao to criticise US imperialism through expressing his 
support for black people's protests against racial discrimination in America.37 His support 
for the black Americans was expected · not only to give African countries a favourable 
impression of Beijing, but to clearly present the "US imperialists" as the enemy of the 
people. 
Criticism of US imperialism by Red Guards was not as strong as __their criticism of 
revisionism, partly because there was no direct US aggression in China at that time, unless 
the American relationship with Taiwan was regarded as aggression. In addition, the CCP 
focused on denunciations of "-revisionism" more than imperialism, when the Red Guards 
emerged in mid 1966. (However, US imperialism was always thought of as the root of all 
evil, but perhaps paradoxically, Soviet "revisionism" was attacked more.) 
34Ibid., p.12. 
35
'Huyu shijie renmin lianheqilai fandui Meiguo diguozhuyi de zhongzu qishi, zhichi Meiguo heiren fandui 
zhongzu qishi de douzheng de shengming [Calling upon the people of the world to unite to oppose racial 
discrimination by U.S. imperialism and support the American Negroes in their struggle against racial 
discrimination]' by Mao Zedong, 8 August 1963, in Zhongguo Funii No.9, 1963, p.2. 
36lbid. 
37In the statement, Mao said that he had been asked by a black American leader to issue a statement in 
favour of black Americans' struggles against racial discrimination. See the first sentence of the same 
statement in Zhongguo Funii No.9, 1963, p.1. 
1 2 
China's verbal attacks against the revisionists in the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union were even more extreme than those against the United States. It is interesting to note 
that Chinese articles sometimes used words such as "shameless" and "shameful" in their 
criticisms of the leaders of the USSR. The first two quotes below were made by the CCP 
when it was trying hard to form an international united front against the imperialists in the 
early 1960s, and the last quote was made by the CCP at the peak of the Cultural Revolution 
(CCP emphasis on the international anti-imperialist struggle became less significant during 
the time): 
Is this not tantamount to shamelessly claiming that some sort of "leadership" 
exists in the international communist movement and that you (the Soviet 
leaders) have this "leadership?"3 8 
To cater to the needs of imperialism, they (the Soviet leaders) are undermining 
the national-liberation movement and becoming more and more shameless 
apologists of U.S. neo-colonialism.39 
By collaborating with U.S. imperialism in the "two Chinas" plot, the Soviet 
revisionist ruling clique will only further expose its shameful features as U.S. 
imperialism's accomplice before people of the whole world.40 
The CCP's choice of words was thus consistent even when the international conditions 
around China had changed. Such language speaks of Chinese contempt for Soviet 
"betrayals." The CCP attempted to show the "Soviet revisionists" in a bad light in order to 
emphasise that it was the USSR that was wrong. It also can be said that China tried to show 
an image of the Soviet leaders as corrupted and thus without morals or a sense of shame. To 
38
'The origin and development of the differences between the leadership of the C.P.S.U. and ourselves--
Comment on the open letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.' in PR No.37, 13 September 1963, 
p.20. 
39
'Peaceful coexistence--Two diametrically opposed policies--Comment on the open letter of the Central 
Committee of the C.P.S.U. (6)' in PR No.51, 20 December 1963, p.16. 
40'Strong protest against Soviet revisionist clique's crime of collaborating with U.S. imperialism in "two 
Chinas" plot' in PR No.13, 29 March 1968, p.9. 
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China, the Khrushchev-led Soviet Union seemed to have betrayed the rest of the socialist 
camp 1and their past "great leaders", such as Stalin. 
Moreover, in mid 1963, China complained about the USSR seeking an alliance with 
the United States "in order to abuse China": 
[The] Soviet leaders [ ... ] have been gnashing their teeth in their bitter hatred 
towards socialist China. They use the same language as U.S. imperialism in 
abusing China. This is a U.S.-Soviet alliance against China pure and simple.41 
Some CCP leaders thought that the two big powers would continue to reduce tension 
between themselves and would begin to seek an anti-Chinese policy together. In October 
China claimed that the Soviet revisionists were serving neo-colonialism, headed by the 
United States.42 
The nuclear question is an interesting matter on which to observe China's verbal 
tactics against the USSR. In 1963, China opposed the Soviet claim that Soviet nuclear 
power could protect the whole socialist camp, including China.43 This argument had been 
advanced by Moscow when pursuing a nuclear non-proliferation agreement with the United 
Sates. The grounds for the opposition was that non-proliferation would prevent each country 
in the socialist camp from developing its own defence power.44 China maintained firmly that 
while support from friends was welcome, each country should assure its own defence.45 
The Soviet Union was denounced by China as attempting to monopolise nuclear power with 
the United States and Britain.46 However, about one year after that, China developed its 
own nuclear weapon and celebrated by reporting congratulations from other countries. Some 
of these messages from tiny f 0reign political organisations were presented as if they spoke 
for the masses. The People's Voice of the Communist Party of New Zealand wrote: 
41 
'A betrayal of the Soviet people!' from RMRB (editorial) 'This is betrayal of the Soviet people!', 3 August 
1963, translated in PR No.32, 9 August 1963, p.11. 
42
'Apologists of neo-colonialism--Comment on the open letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. 
(4)' in PR No.43, 25 October 1963, p.14. 
43
'92. Chinese Government statement of 15 August 1963 on proposals for nuclear non-proliferation' in 
Gittings, p.191, originally from 'Statement by the spokesman of the Chinese Government--a comment on 
the Soviet Government's statement of August 3' in People's Daily, 15 August 1963 
44Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., p.192. 
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China's emergence as a nuclear power means a strengthening of the world 
socialist camp, the international working class and the forces of peace.4 7 
Despite the fact that Chinese leaders had attempted reconciliation with the 
Khrushchev-led Soviet Union in 1964, Sino-Soviet mutual denunciation escalated. A 
Hongqi commentator wrote in early 1966 that "world domination by Soviet-US 
collaboration is the spirit of Khrushchev's revisionist line. "48 The CCP often emphasised a 
Soviet-US alliance to try to give the rest of the world the strong impression that imperialism 
and revisionism were inseparable. 
Denunciations of the USSR leaders by Red Guards were extreme. Chinese reaction 
to the "persecution" of a group of Chinese exchange students and the Chinese embassy by 
Soviet policemen in Moscow in February 1967 escalated the tone of criticism: 
[It] has committed a towering crime rarely seen in the annals of global 
diplomacy, and incurred another blood debt to the Chinese people.49 
Once the Soviet revisionist paper tiger is pierced it turns into a worthless pile of 
dog shit.50 
Then "vigorous" actions have in fact revealed that the Soviet revisionist bastards 
are a gang of clowns who dare not be exposed to the light of day!5 l 
A Red Guard article, under the title of "Down with Soviet revisionism! Strangle Brezhnev!" 
introduced a Red Guards' interview with three Soviet "friends" and purported to show how 
much the Soviet people hated Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Kosygin.52 Those Soviet leaders 
47
'Significance of China's nuclear success' in PR No.45, 6 November 1964, p.13. 
48 
'Sugong xin lingdao pengxing Sumei hezuo luxian de gongzhuang [Confessions concemmg line of 
Soviet-US collaboration pursued by new leaders of CPSU]' in HQ No.2, 1966, p. l. 
49
'Zalan Suxiu faxisi mogui jiduan [Smash the Soviet revisionist, fascist group of devils]' in Hongwei 
Zhanbao, 9 February 1967, p.1, in RGP Vol.8, p.2201. 
50·song "wenshen" xiaoji [Delivering "god of plague" notes]' in Honwei Zhanbao, 9 February 1967, p.2, in 
RGP Vol.8 , p.2202. 
51 'Nuchi Suxiu hundan [Angrily denounce the Soviet idiots]' in Dongfanghongbao, 15 February 1967, p.2, 
in RGP Vol.13, p.4221. 
52 'Dadao Suxiu! Jiaosi Bolieriniefu!--Zhongguo renmin bu shi haore de! [Down with Soviet revisionism! 
Strangle Brezhnev!--The Chinese are not people to be trifled with!]' in Shoudu Hongweibing, 14 February 
1967, p.2, in RGP Vol.11, p.3510. 
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were portrayed as the biggest traitors, who had not only became hostile to the socialist 
countries, but had also badly influenced many of the Chinese leaders, such as Liu Shaoqi. 
These Soviet and Chinese leaders were the main targets of the Cultural Revolution. 
Rhetoric of "Third World" struggle 
Chinese verbal encouragement to "the people of the world" was significant. The CCP 
emphasised that they were always on the side of oppressed peoples. In addition, Chinese 
media reported anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist statements by people from "hostile" 
countries, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, in order to show that all the 
people in the world were going to be united against their common "enemies." 
The CCP always emphasised their "full support" for the people of the world. For 
instance, Chinese encouragement went as follows: 
The Chinese people will ... give full support to the people of Palestine and the 
Arab countries in their struggle against U.S. imperialism, a struggle which the 
Chinese people regard as a powerful help in their own struggle against U.S. 
imperialist aggression. 5 3 
All governments that suppressed their people were regarded as US "lackeys" and, according 
to the CCP, the US was the root of all evil. 
Moreover, as shown in the statement above, the Chinese government took a firm 
attitude on the point that the people of each country had to pursue their anti-imperialist 
struggles on their own. This line implicitly indicated China's unwillingness to be directly 
involved in anti-imperialist struggles overseas. This Chinese stand was shown repeatedly in 
their "support" for the Vietnamese people during the war, which was more moral than 
substantial. 
With their verbal support for "the people," mainly of Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
Chinese leaders tried to indicate how many friends they had and how much the imperialists 
and their "lackeys" were isolated in the world. Before the Cultural Revolution, when the 
53'China supports Palestinian and Arab people' in PR No.13, 27 March 1964, p.13. 
1 6 
Chinese leaders often insisted on forming a firm international anti-imperialist united front , 
Song Qingling said in a lecture in Ceylon: 
Those who seek to isolate China are themselves being isolated. The Chinese 
people know they have friends everywhere.54 
She also implied China's leadership in the anti-imperialist struggle: 
[ ... ] because China has stood in the forefront of this struggle, it has become the 
target of a converging attack politically, economically and militarily.55 
Thus China wanted to give itself an image of being a reliable friend to the rest of the "Third 
World" countries. 
This Chinese rhetorical strategy, however, changed after the failure of forming an 
anti-imperialist united front. Once the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, while giving 
encouragement and support for "Third World" countries, the Chinese government no longer 
emphasised that China was a "reliable friend" of them. As I will discuss in the following 
chapters, Chinese rhetoric over international matters during the Cultural Revolution saw a 
great influence from Maoism which implicitly presented China under Mao as the 
revolutionary leader of the world. 
Those who opposed the US and USSR were referred to by China as being involved 
1n the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle. China was portrayed as one of the 
revolutionaries, and many CCP statements gave the impression that the Chinese government 
had militant friendships with "Third World" countries in the struggle against imperialism. 
However, and especially after mid 1960s, China's isolation in the world became more 
evident. Despite this fact, China's strong verbal support for its "allies" remained unchanged. 
54'United, the people are invincible' in PR No.10, 6 March 1964, p.12. 
55Ibid. 
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1.2. Criticism against the United States over the Vietnam 
question 
The Vietnam War provided a good opportunity for the Chinese Communist Party to 
denounce the United States. The war clearly showed the world an actual example of 
"aggression by the imperialists and their lackeys" and "the people's struggle for national 
liberation." China's denunciation of US imperialism in the war became even more harsh 
when the war escalated in July 1965. In this section I will examine Chinese verbal attacks on 
the US and verbal support for the Vietnamese people. By doing so, I will try to show how 
China attempted to create for itself an image as "the most reliable country" in the socialist 
camp, while actually seeking for a compromise with the United States. 
Some scholars have insisted that Chinese leaders verbally took a firm stand against 
the US, because, even before the US bombing in North Vietnam in 1965, China was quite 
confident of the future victory by the North Vietnamese people. 5 6 In an interview with 
Edgar Snow in January 1965, Mao Zedong implied that he believed in the Vietnamese 
people's victory by themselves.57 It was important for the CCP to give strong verbal 
support for the Vietnamese people in order to give the world, especially the socialist camp, 
an impression that firm Chinese assistance was one of the crucial factors that led the 
Vietnamese people to the success in the war. 
The anti-US statements made by the CCP on Vietnam were quite confident: 
U.S. imperialism will not save itself from disastrous defeat in south Viet Nam, 
whatever scheme it may resort to.58 
More significantly, a Renmin Ribao editorial described China's firm stand against the US 
provocatively: 
56For example, Tao, Jay, 'Mao's world outlook: Vietnam and the revolution in China' in Asian Survey 
Vol.8, No.5, May 1968, pp.417-418 . 
57 Snow, Edgar, 'South of the mountains to north of the seas--January 9, 1965: interview with Chairman 
Mao Tse-tung' in appendixes of Snow, Edgar, The long revolution (Random House, Mew York, 1972), 
p.216. 
58'U.S. move to extend war in South Viet Nam condemned' by the Chinese Government in PR No.3 , 15 
January 1965, p.7. 
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To tell you the truth, we are waiting for you in battle array. If you insist on 
imposing a war on us, then you are sure to receive heavy counter-blows!59 
This statement was made just before US bombings in North Vietnam began in the summer 
of 1965. Mao Zedong had never thought that the US would attack North Vietnam until the 
bombing started.60 The CCP's provocative tone above seems to have been influenced by the 
optimistic prediction by the Chinese leaders. 
CCP leaders attacked the character of US imperialism in extreme language. Peng 
Zhen, then Mayor of Beijing and Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress, called the then US President "the Hitler of today": 
The "Johnson Doctrine" is the fascism of our times, and Johnson is the Hitler of 
today.61 
Moreover, a Ta-kung Pao commentator described the nature of US imperialism as 
"cannibalistic" when the US bombed hospitals and sanatoria in North Vietnam in the 
summer of 1965.62 
However, the extremism in words coincided with moderation in action. China's 
verbal attacks on the US aggression in Vietnam were also aimed at covering up the Maoist 
policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the US. Despite the fact that China had repeatedly 
claimed that US aggression towards Vietnam was the same as aggression towards China,63 
China did not militarily attack the US even when the US bombed North __ Vietnam in July 
1965. In addition to this, soon after the bombing occurred in 1965, Zhu De, then Chairman 
of the National People's Congress, made a speech as follows: 
S9·u.s. aggressors must be punished' from RMRB (editorial), 9 February 1965, translated in PR No.7, 12 
February 1965, p.18. 
60
'39. Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong--Beijing, 17 November 1968' in Westad, Odd Arne, Chen Jian, 
Stein T0nnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung and James G. Hershberg (eds.), 77 conversations between Chinese and 
foreign leaders on the wars in Indochina, 1964-1977, Working Paper No.22 (Cold War International History 
Profect of the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 1998), p.145. According to the article, Mao 
Zedong told Pham Van Dong, the head of a DRV delegation to Moscow, "I never thought that they would 
attack North Vietnam. But my prediction was wrong when they bombed the North. [ ... ]." 
61 
'Peng Chen's speech at Peking rally--welcoming the D.R.V. National Assembly Delegation' in PR No.30, 
23 July 1965, p.8. 
62
'Ta-Kung Pao protests against U.S. bombing of hospitals in North Vietnam' from Xinhua, 17 July 1965, 
in Survey No.3502, 22 July 1965, p.28. 
63
'Meiguo dui Yuenan Minzhu gongheguo de qinfan jiu shi dui Zhongguo de qinfan [The US aggression 
against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam means aggression against China]' by the Chinese Government 
in RMRB, 6 August 1964, p.l. 
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The Chinese people have made every preparation for countering the U.S. 
imperialists' scheme to expand their war adventures. No matter what happens and 
how costly the price, we will stay firm on this stand of proletarian 
internationalism.64 
But the CCP seemed to calculate the possible cost of the full involvement in the war. The 
article, "Long live the victory of people's war!" written by Lin Biao, then Vice-Chairman of 
the Central Committee of the CCP, Vice-Premier and Minister of National Defence, skilfully 
tried to avoid China's direct involvement in people's war: 
Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said that our fundamental policy should rest on the 
foundation of our own strength. Only by relying on our own efforts can we in 
all circumstances remain invincible. [ ... ]. In order to make a revolution and to 
fight a people's war and be victorious, it is imperative to adhere to the policy of 
self-reliance, rely on the strength of the masses in one's own country and prepare 
to carry on the fight independently even when all material aid from outside is cut 
off. If one does not operate by one's own efforts, does not independently ponder 
and solve the problems of the revolution in one's own country and does not rely 
on the strength of the masses, but leans wholly on foreign aid--even though this 
be aid from socialist countries which persist in revolution--no victory can be 
won, or be consolidated even if it is won.65 
As a result, China avoided any hint of a direct confrontation against the US, even 
though Chen Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that the Chnese people were all ready 
for giving "staunch backing" to the North Vietnamese people and that China "absolutely 
[ would] not stand idly by [ ... ]. "66 Furthermore, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of 
the founding of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, Vice-Chairman of the 
64
'Banquet for Vietnam National Assembly Friendship Delegation in Peking' from Xinhua, 13 July 1965, in 
Survey No.3498, 16 July 1965, p.24. 
65'Long live the victory of people's war!' in HQ No.IO, 1965, p.17, translated in PR No.36, 3 September 
1965, p.22. 
66'U.S. aggressive troops must be forced to quit Indo-China' by Chen Yi in PR No.9, 26 February 1965, 
p.4. 
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National Defence Council, Ye Jianying, said to the Vietnamese guests at a banquet as 
follows: 
Come what may and irrespective of any risks, we will support you in all fields 
with all our strength, till the U.S. aggressors are thoroughly liquidated.67 
But the Chinese military support in actuality was much more limited than what might be 
expected from Y e's speech above. 
The CCP criticised the US as harshly as possible, while emphasising "militant 
friendship" between the Chinese people and the Vietnamese people.68 Both the criticism and 
support by the CCP gave a strong impression that the Vietnam War was the matter of all the 
people (especially Asian people) who were against the US. The CCP wanted to create an 
imaginary picture of "Asia versus the imperialists" over the Vietnam War. 
Washington's sending south Korean puppet troops to south Viet Nam is part of 
its malicious plan to "make Asians fight Asians. "69 
The public statements that the Chinese people were thoroughly supporting the people's 
liberation war in Asia and that the Chinese people were sharing hardships with other Asian 
people were supposed to contribute to the promotion of China's image in Asia. Therefore 
China's interests should be seen as the same as those of other Asian people. A Renmin 
Ribao editorial also denounced US imperialism as the cause of the establishment of a 
"Northeast Asia nµlitary alliance": 
It is perfectly clear that speeding up the "Japan-south (sic) Korea talks" 1s 
entirely the result of behind-the-scene (sic) prodding by U.S. imperialism.70 
Thus China attempted to impress upon the rest of the peoples of the world, especially 
the Asian peoples, a hostile image of the US. At the same time, China tried to present itself 
67'China celebrates N.F.L. Anniversary' in PR No.52, 24 December 1965, p.8. 
68
'Chinese residents in Vietnam called on to participate in Vietnamese people's anti-U.S. struggle' from 
Xinhua, 6 July 1965, in Survey No.3494, p.34. 
69,A grave move' from RMRB (editorial) 'A grave U.S. move to spread the flames of war in Indo-China', 14 
January 1965, translated in PR No.4, 22 January 1965, p.7. 
70'Washington's new move to aggravate Far East tension' from RMRB (editorial) 'Another grave move by 
the United States to aggravate tension in the Far East', 23 February 1965, translated in PR No.9, 26 February 
1965, p.14. 
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as an Asian, socialist country that would stand with and support its fellow Asian nations and 
that would never compromise with US imperialism on peaceful settlement of the war. 
CCP denunciations of the United States became less provocative after the Cultural 
Revolution started. Instead, many of the Peking Review articles on the Vietnam War in 
1967 emphasised Chinese support in accordance with the "teachings" of Mao Zedong. Chen 
Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said: 
Consistently following the teachings of our great leader Chairman Mao, the 
Chinese Government and people regard it as their bounden internationalist duty 
to support and aid the Vietnamese people's revolutionary struggle.71 
Guo Moruo (Kuo Mo-jo ), a Vice-Chairman of the National People's Congress Standing 
, Committee and Chairman of the China Peace Committee, said in a Beijing rally for anti-US 
over the Vietnam War: 
Thanks to the [Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution] initiated and led personally 
by our great leader Chairman Mao, [ ... ] the Chinese people had further 
revolutionized themselves, and become ever more militant and high-spirited, thus 
bringing still greater strength into play to support and aid the Vietnamese 
people's war of resistance against U.S. aggression [ ... J.72 
In November, Premier Zhou Enlai received Ngo Minh Loan, Ambassador of the DRV, and 
stated: 
The Chinese Government and people, who follow the teachings of the great 
leader Chairman Mao, have always taken it as their bounden internationalist 
obligation to support the Vietnamese people in their war against U.S. 
aggression and for national salvation.7 3 
In the early 1968, Zhou Enlai again said to Ngo Minh Loan: 
71 
'Statement of the Chinese Foreign Ministry on the new developments in the Vietnam situation' in PR 
No.11, 10 March 1967, p.13. 
72
'Firm support for the Vietnamese people to completely defeat U.S. imperialism' in PR No.13, 24 March 
1967, p.10. 
73
'Premier Chou En-lai expresses firm support for D.R.V. government statement's just stand' in PR No.46, 
10 November 1967, p.25. 
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[ ... ] armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought, the 700 million Chinese people who 
had been tempered in the great proletarian cultural revolution vowed to provide a 
powerful backing for the Vietnamese people and resolutely support them in 
carrying the war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation through to 
the end.74 
While maintaining its expression of firm support for the Vietnamese people, the CCP thus 
seems to have shifted the point of emphasis in Vietnamese-related rhetoric from militant and 
provocative denunciations of the US to Mao-led China's international obligation to back up 
the Vietnamese people and to support them in their fight for "national salvation," the 
reunification of the nation under communist leadership. The CCP, however, continued 
criticising the US for trying to settle the war peacefully. 
China did not support North Vietnam by direct military intervention, although China 
often expressed highly militant attitudes in its publications. China thus maintained the line 
that any Chinese military troops would not be sent abroad. Instead, as Ye Jianying had said 
(see above), China supported the Vietnamese people in some fields with "all [their] 
strength." One study claimed that betweeri October 1965 and March 1968, three hundred and 
twenty thousand Chinese soldiers were sent to Vietnam, and a great amount of goods were 
sent by China to Vietnam. 7 5 Michael Schaller claimed that Beijing sent about fifty thousand 
soldiers to North Vietnam from 1965 to 1968.76 He said, "Though not_ participating in 
ground combat, they (Chinese soldiers sent from Beijing) helped operate anti-aircraft 
weapons and communications facilities."77 Moreover, Gordon H. Chang said that "the 
number of Chinese support personnel ( engineers, workers, technicians) in North Vietnam 
increased to 40,000 during the first part of 1966, [ ... ]. "78 Whatever the number of Chinese 
74
'0ur great leader Chairman Mao and Vice-Chairman Lin offer warmest congratulations on new and great 
victories in Vietnam's war against U.S. aggression--Premier Chou and Vice-Premier Chen Yi receive 
Vietnamese Ambassador and the acting head of South Vietnam N .F.L. Permanent Mission to China' in PR 
No.6, 9 February 1968, p.6. 
75uno, Kobayashi and Yabuki (eds.), p.238. 
76Schaller, Michael, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (Oxford University Press , New 
York, 1979), p.155. 
77Ibid., pp.155-156. 
78 Chang, Gordon H., Friends and enemies--The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 
(Stanford University Press, California, 1990), p.272. 
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soldiers sent from. Beijing was, we can see from. this that China was reluctant to involve 
itself fully in the war, while often "showing" its militant images to the rest of the world. 
What Beijing did for North Vietnam. was the maxim.um. support that would not provoke 
direct US attacks on China.79 China did not even publicise the fact of its actual support until 
long after this intensive period. 
Thus Chinese official rhetoric over the Vietnam. War was quite subtle. On the one 
hand, Beijing wanted to show its militancy against imperialism.. That was supposed be a 
significant difference between socialist China and "revisionist" Soviet Union. But, on the 
other hand, the CCP implied that China would not help the Vietnamese people by sending its 
own troops. China wanted to become more important both in the socialist camp and in Asia, 
while avoiding full involvement in people's liberation wars. Moreover, the CCP's "patience" 
in action seems to have drawn the clear line between "socialist China" that had supported the 
neighbour's "national liberation struggle" by its own people and "revisionist Soviet Union" 
that had extended its military power abroad. 
1.3. The importance of Chinese interests and security 
China's call for worldwide anti-imperialist struggles and its international revolutionary line 
som.etim.es contradicted its national interests and security. The contradiction was particularly 
significant when, for instance, China established diplomatic relations with the "bourgeois" 
French government in 1964. Despite its denunciations of colonialism., the CCP ignored the 
de Gaulle government's control in French Som.aliland80 and praised the friendship between 
France and China. By doing so, Chinese leaders were pursuing their national interests, such 
as gaining justification for nuclear development. 81 The French governm.ent was also 
79uno, Kobayashi and Yabuki (eds.), p.238. 
80van Ness, p.96. 
8 l Halperin, Morton H., 'China and the bomb--Chinese nuclear strategy' in MacFarquhar, Roderick (ed.), 
China under Mao: politics takes command--a selection of articles from The China Quarterly (The M.I.T. 
Press, Massachusetts, 1966), p.454. 
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opposing the US-Soviet "nuclear domination," so the alliance with France was supposed to 
have given support for China's nuclear development. 
The CCP's attitude towards anti-British riots in Hong Kong in the summer of 1967 
1s another good example. The CCP did not give thorough verbal support to the anti-
colonialist and anti-imperialist movements there, because China wanted to maintain "peaceful 
coexistence" with Britain in order, for one thing, to maintain Hong Kong's prosperity, 
which had largely helped China pn?per economically and to keep Hong Kong open as a door 
I\ 
to the outside world. (I will discuss this later in this section.) Although the CCP gave the 
Hong Kong "revolutionaries" full verbal support at the beginning, the amount of the verbal 
support for the riots significantly declined soon after the riots escalated into a crucial stage in 
the summer of 1967. China's militant attitude towards Britain over "colonial" Hong Kong 
during the short time when the revolutionaries were openly supported by the CCP was quite 
exceptional. 
In this section, I will examine the verbal strategies of the Chinese publications mainly 
over the French and Hong Kong matters in order to look at the CCP's stance that gave 
national interests priority over the international anti-imperialist struggle. 
Chinese rhetoric over Sino-French diplomacy 
In January 1962, Renmin Ribao criticised the French President de Gaulle as being the same 
as the US imperialists: 
Firstly, it (France) is exerting every effort to maintain its control over the 
French "community." For this reason, it is exasperated by the U.S. thrust into 
its spheres of influence in Africa. To preserve its economic interests in Katanga 
Province, it is opposing the U.S. attempt to swallow up the Congo. Another 
source of its anxiety is that the establishment of U.S. strongholds close to 
central Africa may become a dagger at the heart of the French "community." [ ... ] 
de Gaulle stands on the same front as the U.S. ruling circles on the fundamental 
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questions of protecting imperialist and colonial interests and opposmg the 
socialist camp. 82 
Moreover, in March, Peking Review carried an article about anti-government movements 
by the French people over the Algerian question. 8 3 The article denounced the French 
government's colonial policy: 
Throughout the long years of the colonial war m Algeria, the people of 
metropolitan France have fought steadfastly against their government's colonial 
policy. [ ... ]. Their struggle, complementing the armed struggle of the Algerian 
people, has played an important part in forcing the French Government to sit 
down for peace talks with Algeria.84 
Even though Algeria became independent in 1962, France still kept French Somaliland under 
its control. 
However, China managed to establish diplomatic relations with the French 
government in 1964 in the belief that this might create difficulties for the United States' 
relationships with European countries.85 Despite the fact that the then French government 
under President de Gaulle was obviously "bourgeois" and "colonialist," and that the 
government had been a target of the struggle by "oppressed peoples" of Africa, China chose 
to maintain a peaceful relationship with the government. In January 1964, China celebrated 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries as follo~s: 
Although the two countries have different social systems, yet both peoples love 
peace and have a traditional bond of friendship. The establishment of normal 
diplomatic relations between China and France is not only conducive to the 
further developme·nt of friendship between the two countries, but also to the 
realization of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social 
systems and to world peace [ ... ]. On the proclamation of the People's Republic 
82
'De Gaulle's desperate struggle for "big power status"' in RMRB, 9 January 1962, translated in 'De Gaulle 
wants "big power status"' in PR No.2, 12 January 1962, p.19. 
83 Algeria had been resisting the French colonial policy since 31 October 1954. 
84The French people's fight for peace in Algeria,' written by Yang Xiaoneng, in PR No.11 , 16 March 1962, 
p.8. 
85van Ness, pp.98-99. 
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of China, Chairman Mao Tse-tung declared: "This Government is willing to 
establish diplomatic relations with any foreign government which is willing to 
observe the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect of territorial 
integrity and sovereignty." 8 6 
Thus China emphasised "peaceful coexistence between countries with different social 
systems," which was one of the ultimate purposes of the world revolution, without referring 
to the colonialist character of the then French government. For China, France was an ally 
who opposed the common enemies; the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Mao Zedong's conversation with French Minister of State, Andre Malraux, in 1965, 
revealed that, in Chinese international relations, Mao attached great importance to making 
"various kinds of friends" through finding "something in common" with each other.87 He 
also implied at the interview that China should establish friendly relations with any countries 
as long as they were against US imperialism: 
Chairman Mao: [ ... ]. We have various kinds of friends. You are 
[ ... ] one 
been 
We have 
with you. 
Malraux: 
other. 
kind of friend. At ·the same time, Chairman of the 
Indonesian Communist Party, Aidit, who has 
visiting in Beijing, is also a friend of ours [ .. . ]. 
something in common with Aidit, and also cb 
Those common grounds are different from each 
Chairman Mao: Some of them are the same. For example, (you 
and 
86'Greeting the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations' in PR No.5, 31 January 1964, p.10. 
87 
'Jiejian Faguo guowu buzhang Maerluo shi tanhua julu [Report on conversation at the interview with 
French Minister of State Malraux]' in Mao Zedong Sixiang wansui [Long live Mao Zedong Thought], Vol.2, 
June 1967, p.370. 
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ourselves have common ground like) how to deal 
with 
the double-dealers; US imperialism and British 
· · 1· [ ] 8 8 1mpena ism ..... 
China's support for France over the nuclear question 1n 1963 contributed to its 
justification for its own atomic bomb development. 89 France was opposing the United 
States, which was wishing for the conclusion of a nuclear test ban with Britain, France, the 
Soviet Union and China.90 Morton H. Halperin has noted that "the Chinese have sought by 
analogy to make their case for the need for a Chinese nuclear capability by stressing the 
French need for such a force and the American attempt to dominate its alliance by being the 
sole Wes tern nuclear power. "9 1 In a government statement, China expressed its opposition 
to a treaty on the partial halting of nuclear tests which had been signed by the United States, 
Britain and the Soviet Union on 25 July: 
The central purpose of this treaty is, through a partial ban on nuclear tests, to 
prevent all the threatened peace-loving countries, including China, from 
increasing their defence capability, so that the United States may be more 
unbridled in threatening and blackmailing these countries.92 
The friendship with the French government deteriorated soon after the Cultural 
Revolution began. To China, an international united front against the Unit~d States was not 
the key for the "world revolution" any more. Efforts for making friendly ties with other anti-
US governments and communist and socialist parties almost appeared meaningless to the 
CCP unless based on opposition to the USSR. China's diplomacy became radical; whoever 
opposed Chinese "revolutionary" policy, was regarded by China as its enemy. Thus a 
change in China's interests became observable. 
88Ibid. 
89Halperin, p.454. 
90chang, pp.233-234. 
91 Halperin, p.454. 
92
'Statement of the Chinese govemment--Advocating the complete, thorough, total and resolute prohibition 
and destruction of nuclear weapons/ proposing a conference of the government heads of all countries of the 
world' in PR No.31, 2 August 1963, p.7. 
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Forty nine Chinese students marched to the Soviet Embassy in Paris in order to 
protest against the Soviet violence aimed at Chinese Maoist students in Moscow at the 
beginning of the year. At that time, the French police tried to calm down the Chinese 
demonstration. The CCP denounced the French "raid" on those "heroic" Chinese students: 
Violating the Chinese students' deep feelings for Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the 
most respected and beloved leader of the Chinese people, the police tore up his 
portraits and trampled on copies of Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung 
[ ... ]. (In Beijing,) [the] walls of the (French) embassy building and the grounds 
outside were posted with the slogans: [ ... ] "Bash in the French thugs' heads!"93 
Van Ness has pointed out that, by mid 1966, China first mentioned its support for 
French Somaliland, which had been under French colonial rule. 94 (Foreign Minister Chen 
Yi mentioned the French Somali Coast as one of the places in which had been struggling "to 
oppose colonialism and neo-colonialism and to win and safeguard national 
independence."95) Although Chen Yi's speech did not refer to "armed" struggle of French 
Somali people, Van Ness suggests that the expression of the support was partly due to tense 
Sino-French relations, "as Paris sought · to develop closer ties with the Soviet Union and 
made efforts to find a basis for negotiations to end the Vietnam War, [ ... ] . "96 The rhetorical 
change might be partly due to internal struggles in the CCP leadership just before the 
Cultural Revolution. Harish Kapur notes that Chinese "press articles on __ France lost their 
earlier friendliness" in mid 1967.97 An article in Peking Review used the term "French 
imperialism" and criticised France for being on the US side in the Middle East:9 8 
French imperialism, which claimed to be "neutral" during these events,99 has 
actually played "big power politics" along with the United States , Britain and the 
93
'Chinese students' valiant struggle in Paris' in PR No.6, 3 February 1967, p.30. 
94van Ness, p.99. (footnote no.32) 
95
'Vice-Premier Chen Yi's speech--At the opening ceremony of Afro-Asian writers' emergency meeting--' in 
PR No.27, 1 July 1966, p.33. 
96van Ness, p.99. (footnote no.32) 
97 Kapur, Barish, Distant neighbours--China and Europe (Pinter Publishers, London, 1990), p.92. 
98 'Arab people, unite, make sustained efforts, and fight imperialism to the end !' in RMRB (editorial), 11 
June 1967, translated in PR No.25, p.12. 
99 Israel, with support from the US, attacked Syria and other Arab countries. 
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Soviet Union and shown itself as standing on the side of the U.S.-Israeli 
aggressors. 1 OO 
Chinese rhetoric in publications thus became hostile to the French government again. As in 
so many other areas of Chinese foreign relations, in mid 1967 the wish to appear radical 
seemed to outweigh the previous policy of foreign alliances. 
Chinese rhetoric over the British occupation of Hong Kong 
Now I will look at Chinese rhetorical strategies towards British colonialism in Hong Kong. 
Chinese criticisms of British imperialism also indicated the superiority of national interests 
over support for struggles of national liberation. 
Hong Kong was supposed to be a site for struggles against imperialism. Once the 
Cultural Revolution started, anti-British demonstrations in Hong Kong, which is said to 
have begun for industrial reasons, developed into violent national liberation movements. 
After several acts of violent suppression of Hong Kong activists by the British authorities in 
May 1967, Peking Review said: 
The whole nation, they (the people of mainland China) said, was determined to 
smash [the] British imperialist's reactionary rule in Hongkong, destroy this hell 
under British colonial domination and support the struggle of their comp11triots 
in Hongkong to the end. IO 1 
Another Peking Review writer wrote: 
Politically, the "dignity" and "prestige" of the British colonial rulers in 
Hongkong have been shattered and they have been completely exposed as paper 
tigers. Thus, "governor" Trench has been revealed as the hangman he is; people 
have started calling British colonial officials names and condemning the British 
authorities in the "courtroom"; [ ... ].102 
1 OO'Arab people, unite, make sustained efforts, and fight imperialism to the end! ' in RMRB (editorial), 11 
June 1967, translated in PR No.25, 16 June 1967, p.12. 
101'Hongkong's revolutionary mass movement on the upsurge' in PR No.25 , 16 June 1967, p.32. 
102'50,000 workers strike in Hongkong' in PR No.27, 30 June 1967, p.25. 
30 
The CCP declared that the suppressions were committed not only against the people of Hong 
Kong, but against "the entire Chinese people." 103 Moreover, shortly after this statement 
China said as follows: 
Hong Kong has been Chinese territory since ancient times [ ... ]. Sooner or later, 
the Chinese people will make a thoroughgoing liquidation of this debt with 
British imperialism. I 04 
Thus the CCP's denunciations of British imperialism were significant. Chinese authorities 
said that British imperialism violated Chinese territorial sovereignty and abused the Chinese 
people by oppressing some of them. 
Such militancy in Chinese policy towards the British authorities in Hong Kong, 
however, had never been seen before the summer of 1967. Kevin P. Lane notes that a 
People's Daily editorial in 1963 revealed Chinese "conservative" policy on British 
occupation in Hong Kong: 
With regard to the outstanding issues, which are a legacy from the past, we have 
always held that, when conditions are ripe, they should be settled peacefully 
through negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the status quo should be 
maintained. [ ... ]. To be frank, there is no need for the Chinese people to prove 
their courage and staunchness in combatting imperialism by making a show of 
force on the questions of Hong Kong and Macau. I 05 
Van Ness has explained "colonial" Hong Kong's importance to the Chinese 
economy, suggesting that "Hong Kong during 1965 was politically one of the most quiet 
spots in Asia [ ... ] . "106 He also pointed out that, although the Chinese press criticised the 
United States for using Hong Kong as a military base in the Vietnam War, Beijing did not 
attack British use of Hong Kong for military purposes in 1965.107 In early 1966, Peking 
l03'Tighten the noose around the neck of British imperialism, says Jen-min Jih-pao' from Xinhua, 7 August 
1967, in Survey No.3998, 10 August 1967, p.24. 
104'Hong Kong is Chinese territory' in RMRB, 20 August 1967, translated in Xinhua, 20 August 1967, in 
Survey No.4007, 23 August 1967, p.23. 
105People's Daily, 8 March 1963, quoted in Lane, Kevin P., Sovereignty and the status quo--The historical 
roots of China's Hong Kong policy (Westview Press, Boulder, 1990), p.65. 
l06van Ness, p.161. 
107Ibid., p.162. (footnote no.4) 
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Review carried an article which criticised British "colonial" policy in Suez, but again the 
article did not criticise the British occupation of Hong Kong, other than briefly describing 
Hong Kong as a military base of Britain: 
Major British military bases in the area include Aden, Singapore, [ ... ] and 
Maldive (sic); these link an important sea route farther to the east with 
Hongkong as the terminal for shipping colonial troops to the east to suppress 
national-liberation movements." 108 
At least in the Peking Review, the CCP did not attack the British authorities in Hong 
Kong until mid 1967. Peking Review in May carried the Chinese Foreign Ministry's strong 
protest with the British Government against a violent suppression of patriotic Chinese 
activists by the British authorities in Hong Kong. 109 Although the protest denounced the 
British government as pursuing a violent anti-China policy with the United States, it did not 
mention British colonialism in Hong Kong: 
[ ... ] the atrocities perpetrated by the British authorities in Hongkong are the 
result of long premeditation and are a component part of the British 
Government's scheme of collusion with U.S. imperialism against China. [ ... ]. 
The Chinese Government demands in all seriousness that the British 
Government instruct the British authorities in Hong Kong as follows: 
Immediately accept all the just demands put forward by Chinese workers and 
residents in Hongkong; Immediately stop all fascist measures; Immediately set 
free all the arrested persons (including workers, journalists and cameramen); 
Punish the culprits responsible for there sanguinary atrocities, offer apologies to 
the victims and compensate for all their losses; and Guarantee against the 
occurrence of similar incidents. 110 
This Chinese rhetorical strategy indicated that, even at this stage, China made efforts not to 
bring about serious confrontation with the British government over colonialism in Hong 
108'British strategy east of Suez' in PR No.IO, 4 March 1966, p.19. 
109'Chinese government lodges most urgent and strongest protest with British government' in PR No.21 , 19 
May 1967, pp.14-15. 
110Ibid. 
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Kong. That ultimately meant that Beijing admitted British occupation of Hong Kong, while 
denouncing colonialism and neo-colonialism in general. 
Even after the Chinese official publications explicitly denounced the British 
government as colonialist, the rhetoric was somewhat ambiguous in terms of anti-imperialist 
protests: 
If you (the British government) persist in being hostile to the Chinese people to 
the end, then you must bear all the grave consequences arising therefrom.111 
If the CCP were thoroughly revolutionary and were devotedly supporting Hong Kong's 
national liberation struggle, Beijing would have conveyed to London more direct words, 
such as "Get out of Hong Kong." In addition, China never chose to use the military option 
of driving Britain out by force. Although the CCP had said that Hong Kong was a part of 
Chinese territory in mid 1967 (see the latter part of this section), Beijing maintained its 
stance not to intervene militarily outside 1950 borders (except over boundary questions). To 
China, like the case in Vietnam, extension of military power abroad meant imperialism. 
A Red Guard article described the history of British aggression into China since 1837 
and criticised it: 
In this almost hundred years, since British imperialism dominated our Hong 
Kong, (British imperialism) has changed Hong Kong to a dark hell of the 
people. [ ... ]. [We will] take revenge; down with British imperialism! 11~-
The phrase "a dark hell of the people" gives the image of imperialism, which is the "root of 
all evil." Some Red Guards showed increasing hostility against "British imperialism." 
The fact that Zhou Enlai instructed Red Guards "let's criticize but not too much" 11 3 
in relation to their violent actions in August 114 contradicted the briefly dominant assertion of 
armed struggles against imperialism. He emphasised the importance of rather moderate 
policy which had been advocated by Chinese leaders, including Mao, since early 1967 (see 
111 'Strongest protest against British imperialist armed provocation along the border' in PR No.29, 14 July 
1967, p.35. 
112
'Yingdi qinhua zui'e shi [The evil history of British imperialist aggression in China]' in Waishi Fenglei, 
14 July 1967, pp.5-6, in RGP Vol.13, p.4395. 
l 13Robinson in Robinson (ed.), p.263. 
l 14Gurtov in Robinson (ed.), p.352. and Cradock, pp.59-70. 
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below). According to a Japanese newspaper, in September 1967, Zhou issued six 
restrictions on the Red Guard faction which had burnt down the office of the British Charge 
d'Affaires in Beijing in August: 
(1) it (the Red Guard faction) should not beat up foreigners; (2) it should not 
destroy buildings; (3) it should not set fire to buildings and cars; ( 4) it should 
not intrude into buildings; (5) it should not obstruct, and (6) when it stages 
struggles against embassies, it can go as far as the gates of embassies and it 
should not enter further.115 
His instructions were displayed on wall newspapers in Beijing. 116 Shortly before Zhou's 
instructions were given, Guangming Ribao in Beijing reported an article that insisted upon 
the importance of theoretical criticism rather than violence that would not "touch people to 
their souls," while dealing with internal struggles.117 These peaceful attitudes towards 
imperialism had been harshly denounced by Maoists as being revisionist until then, 
although, in spring, Mao himself said, "We should carry out struggles in a more civilized 
manner." 11 8 
Even though the advocacy of the peaceful line was opposite to the line that the CCP 
had verbally insisted on, the strategy was necessary to calm down Hong Kong 
revolutionaries. The CCP seemed to be afraid that escalation of the riots might lead to a 
serious destruction of Sino-British relations that had brought and woul4-continue to bring 
great economic benefits to China. The CCP probably never wished to have a serious military 
clash with Britain, especially in Hong Kong, which is geographically a part of China. China 
115 
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could have fought against Britain if the CCP had devotedly fallowed its assertion of armed 
struggles against imperialism. Unlike the case of the Vietnam War, China had declared that 
Hong Kong was a part of the Chinese territory .119 The Maoists, however, did not choose 
the thorough anti-imperialist line, and sought to look after their own national interests and 
security instead. 
Thus the rhetorical strategies of the CCP in the Sino-French relationships and over 
the British domination of Hong Kong revealed Chinese nationalist sentiment that usually 
gave its country's interest and security priority over support for anti-imperialist, anti-
colonialist and national liberation movements. Even when China's foreign policy became 
more radical in 1967, the radicalism was nearly always restrained by considerations of 
national interest. The gap between the militant rhetoric and the moderate action was 
significant. 
1.4. Denunciation of revisionist diplomacy 
One of the stated purposes of the Cultural Revolution in China was to sweep away 
revisionism within the Chinese Communist Party. In order to denounce revisionists, the 
Maoists of China sometimes accused "revisionists" of damaging China's image abroad. The 
revolutionary image of China was quite important for the Maoists to keep, because, given 
their previously mentioned concerns with national interest, their break with the "revisionist" 
USSR and so on, they wanted China to be a leader of world revolution.1 20 The main targets 
of those denunciations were Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, and 
Chen Yi, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister. 
Their friendly tour around Indonesia in April 1963 became one of the main targets of 
criticism during the Cultural Revolution. The friendly exchange with the then Indonesian 
President Sukarno was regarded by the Maoists as revisionist, because the Sukarno 
119·Hongkong is Chinese territory' in PR No.35, 25 August 1967, p.21. 
120
'Mao Zedong guanyu "zhanliie bushu" de jianghua [Mao Zedong's speech on "strategic plan"]' by 
Shaoshan Editorial Department, September 1967, quoted in Feiqing Yanjiu No.15, 30 March 1968, p.92, in 
Important talks by Mao Zedong , filed material (A.D. Hope Library, The Australian National University) 
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government was defined as bourgeois in late 1960s. In addition, disputes between Chen Yi 
and the Maoists over the question of exporting Mao Zedong Thought also led to harsh 
denunciations of Chen Yi. 
In this chapter I will examine how much importance the Maoists attached to China's 
image abroad and what kinds of difference there were between the "revisionists" and the 
"Maoists" in their points of view on China's place in the world. 
Chinese "revisionists" were harshly criticised by revolutionary Communist leaders 
and Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution for trying to maintain peaceful relationships 
with overseas imperialism and revisionism. Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi were two of the 
Chinese leaders most strictly criticised for their "revisionist" foreign policies which, from 
Chinese revolutionaries' points of view, gave a bad image of revolutionary China overseas. 
Liu Shaoqi was attacked for disgracing the Chinese people by pursuing counter-
revolutionary foreign policy: 
According to Chairman Mao's teachings, the foreign policy of our socialist 
country can only firmly cling to the internationalist spirit of the proletariat by 
staging large-scale rebellions against imperialism, revisionism and reaction, and 
supporting the liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples and nations. 
However, counter-revolutionary revisionist Liu Shao-ch'i carried out an out-and-
out revisionist foreign policy, prostrated at the feet of US imperiali§_m and 
Soviet revisionism, made the great Chinese people lose face, and brought 
disgrace to the heroes who fought bloody battles against US imperialism, Soviet 
revisionism and their lackeys and heroically laid down their lives. The towering 
crimes committed by him against the world (sic) people cannot be cleansed with 
all the water of the Pacific Ocean.121 
Speeches given by Liu from the late 1950s to the early 1960s were the main targets for the 
attacks, partly because many of the speeches praised the Soviet Union as a model of a 
121 'Carrying out the revisionist foreign policy, making every effort to extol US imperialism and Soviet 
revisionism, catering for the bourgeois order, and causing the great Chinese people to lose face' in pamphlet, 
published by the Liaison Station "Pledging to fight a bloody battle with Liu-Deng-Tao to the end" attached 
to August 18 Red Rebel Regiment of Nankai University, April 1967, in SCMM No.653, May 5 1969, 
p.10. 
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successful socialist country. As far as China's aim was to pursue the socialist revolution 
through to the end, it was supposed to be effective for China to make its commitment to the 
revolution appeal to the rest of the world by attacking the "revisionist" Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Union was portrayed in many Chinese articles not only as a revisionist country that 
failed to keep on fighting against imperialism, but also as a major enemy that had betrayed 
revolutionary countries and the people of the world. 
Moreover, Liu was criticised for carrying out pro-bourgeois diplomacy with Chen Yi 
and his wife in Indonesia in 1963, which resulted in "bringing disgrace to the great Chinese 
people." 122 Even though the Indonesian government of the day was anti-imperialist and had 
been improving its relations with China, having diplomatic dealings with the "bourgeois" 
Sukarno government became a charge that Chinese revolutionaries made against Liu during 
the Cultural Revolution. 
Needless to say, Liu was also denounced as pro-US. In an article in Hongqi, he was 
implicitly said to be asking US imperialism for peace.123 According to his accusers, to seek 
for compromise and peaceful discussion with the imperialists could never be allowed either 
within and outside China. Moreover, the Chinese revolutionaries might have thought that 
Liu's attitude seemed as if the Chinese people were flattering the imperialists. 
Wang Guangmei, wife of Liu Shaoqi, was publicly interrogated by a group of Red 
Guards. She was accused of having acted in unsuitable ways as a Chine~e diplomat when 
she visited Indonesia in 1963: 
You (Wang) went to Indonesia with those clothes on and ganged up with 
Sukarno, and disgraced the Chinese people, and also humiliated all Chinese.124 
The Red Guards meant that the clothes which she wore at that time were very bourgeois and 
she was too friendly to Sukarno, who turned out to be an enemy of the people. It is 
interesting to note that the Red Guards said she had "disgraced the Chinese people" and 
"humiliated all Chinese," because these terms showed that Chinese revolutionaries cared 
122Ibid., p.15. 
123'Aiguozhuyi haishi maiguozhuyi? [patriotism or national betrayal?]' in HQ No.5, 30 March 1967, p.13. 
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about China's image overseas. The Red Guards also criticised Wang for disgracing Chinese 
people by lighting Sukarno's cigarette. 125 Even though picking up those sorts of "crimes" 
might not have been the main thing on which the Red Guards wanted to concentrate, the 
criticisms revealed the Red Guards' pride and confidence that China was the centre of world 
revolution by disputing Sukarno's claim to the position of leading "Third World" advocate. 
Those criticisms of course indirectly targeted Liu Shaoqi. 
Leftist Chinese diplomats, Yao Dengshan and Zhao Xiaoshou, who were in 
Indonesia during the friendly tours by the Chinese leaders, also criticised Wang's "bad 
attitudes" in Indonesia. According to them, Wang's behaviour and the sty le of dress were 
quite bourgeois.126 By criticising Wang in that way, Yao and Zhao tried to suggest that 
revolutionary China's image in Indonesia might have deteriorated because of her. To these 
two revolutionaries, China had to manifest its revolutionary character to the rest of the world 
both in words and behaviour in order to attain the status of the world "revolutionary" leader. 
Chen Yi was also one of the CCP leaders who were dealing with foreign affairs and 
he too received significant verbal attacks. He was denounced as having disgraced the 
Chinese people through "despicable activities" during his tour with Liu in 1963.127 His 
"revisionist diplomatic line" was also said by many Red Guards to have disgraced the "great 
Chinese people." 128 Against the fact that Chen said in 1963 that President Sukarno was his 
commander, a Red Guard article criticised him as follows: 
Does Chen Yi still have even a bit of proletarian principle and national 
pride?l29 
These criticisms of Chen revealed the Red Guards' concern over China's international 
unage. 
125Ibid. 
126'zai guoji shang tuixing touxiang zhuyi de huochou ju' in RMRB, 13 July 1967, p.4. 
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What, then, was the difference between the Maoists and the "revisionists" in policy 
on imperialism? Did Mao and Zhou adopt a more militant policy towards the imperialists? It 
seemed that there was little difference between them in policy on imperialism. Both Mao and 
Liu, in actuality, wanted "peaceful coexistence" with the United States. 
Mao said, "We are at once internationalists and patriots, [ ... ]. "13 o In his theory, 
China was supposed to struggle against powers which opposed the interests of the people of 
the world, while also seeking its own benefits in international relations. In practice, 
however, the latter part of the actual willingness of China's leaders to commit the nation to 
active participation in other countries' "struggles" appears to have been very limited, and 
theory seemed to be more emphasised. Through the 1960s, with Zhou Enlai's support, Mao 
strove to save China from being isolated in the world by winning "Third World" countries 
over to China's side. 
However, China's interests did not necessarily match the interests of revolutionaries 
of the "Third World" countries. Van Ness has pointed out that China, in order to further its 
own interests, tried to maintain friendly relations with some foreign non-communist 
governments such as the Burmese government, which was under attack by local 
revolutionaries. 131 For instance, both Zhou and the then Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited 
Burma for friendly exchange in 1965.132 Interestingly, Zhou said to a Pakistani journalist 
that China was ready to improve relations between China and the United States peacefully: 
The only way to improve Sino-American relations is for the U.S. government to 
prove by deeds its willingness to change its hostile policy toward China. We 
would welcome the helpful efforts in this direction by our friends who are 
willing to offer their good offices between China and the United States.13 3 
Thus Mao thought it was important for China to emphasise to some extent that 
Chinese people were peace-loving and did not want war if it could be avoided, while 
130Mao Zedong, 'Patriotism and internationalism', Selected works of Mao Tse-tung Vol.II (Foreign 
Languages Press, Beijing, 1967), p.196. 
131 Van Ness, pp.97-101. 
l3 2Ibid., p.98. 
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'Zhou Enlai zongli da Bajisitan lianhe tongxunshe shouxi jizhe wen [Chinese Premier answers Pakistan 
Correspondent]' in RMRB, 27 February 1964, from Xinhua, 26 February 1964, in Survey No.3169, 2 March 
1964, p.30. 
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asserting that Chinese people would not be afraid of war if necessary. China needed to 
express its wish for peace, especially after its successful nuclear experiment in 1964, m 
order not to terrify the rest of the world and not to arouse excessive hostility against China. 
Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi were following the same policy as Mao and Zhou. Melvin 
Gurtov concluded that Chen Yi was "faithfully" following Mao's points of view in foreign 
policy.134 Mao, Zhou and Liu had the same points of view on US imperialism and both 
Zhou and Liu followed Mao's united front policy. They also shared the same perspective on 
peaceful coexistence with other countries. In addition, an appeal by Liu and Chen for 
"peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition of the Khrushchev sty le" l 3 5 in Indonesia in 
1963 was exactly the same as what Mao and Zhou had said was important, even though Liu 
and Chen were later denounced as revisionists for that. 
It can be said, through the criticisms of Liu and Chen, that the Maoists' nationalistic 
feelings largely reflected their points of view on China's role in the world revolution. Even 
though the Maoists denounced the "revisionists" for having compromised with imperialism, 
the policy of Mao and Zhou was the same as that of the "revisionists" in terms of avoiding 
direct conflict with the United States andthe Soviet Union. The Maoists also chose to avoid 
direct violent struggle against enemies. It seemed that there was a tacit understanding 
between the Maoists and the "revisionists" in the CCP, at least before 1966, as regards 
publicising China's contrasting images: militant against enemies but peace-loving by nature. 
134Gurtov in Robinson (ed.), p.322. 
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Chapter Two: 
The Mao cult 
2.1. The highest peak of Marxism-Leninism 
In the latter part of the 1960s, Mao Zedong Thought was often praised by Maoists all over 
the world. In their publications, the CCP and other Chinese Maoists, such as Red Guards, 
promoted Mao Zedong Thought by emphasising its "contribution" to the history of 
Marxism-Leninism. A Renmin Ribao editorial on the 22 April 1966 said: 
Comrade Mao Tse-tung has made great contributions to enriching and developing 
the philosophy and economics of Marxism-Leninism, and the Marxist-Leninist 
theories of class struggle, the proletarian political party and military affairs. Mao 
Tse-tung's thinking marks a new stage of development in Marxism-Leninism. It 
is the highest peak of Marxism-Leninism in our epoch.136 
The purpose of this section is not to discuss whether or not the Maoist propaganda 
was correct, or what Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism-Leninism were, but to examine the 
way that the Maoists praised Mao Zedong Thought as the acme of Marxism-Leninism and 
thereby to promote an image of China as the ideological leader of the world revolution. As 
Marxism-Leninism was more recognised worldwide than Mao Zedong Thought, it seems 
that the Maoists particularly _insisted on Mao Zedong Thought as the highest form of 
Marxism-Leninism, because the Maoists needed to justify China's claim to be the true heir of 
the former leader's role of the USSR. In the latter half of the 1960s, the articles/statements 
on Marxism-Leninism in Chinese publications revealed the Maoist aim of justifying Mao 
Zedong Thought in terms of Marxism-Leninism: 
136'In putting politics first, one must constantly put Mao Tse-tung's thinking in command' in PR No.20, 13 
May 1966, p.44. 
4 1 
Comrade Mao Tse-tung's great merit lies in the fact that he has succeeded in 
integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice 
of the Chinese revolution and has enriched and developed Marxism-Leninism by 
his masterly generalization and summation of the experience gained during the 
Chinese people's protracted revolutionary struggle.137 
Mao Tse-tung's thinking is the summit of Marxism-Leninism in the present era, 
the most powerful weapon in our struggle to defeat bourgeois and revisionist 
ideology .13 8 
Our great teacher, great leader, great commander, great helmsman, Chairman 
Mao, is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our time. Chairman Mao has, with the 
gifts of genius, creatively, thoroughly inherited, defended and developed 
Marxism-Leninism, and he improved Marxism-Leninism to an entirely new 
stage. 13 9 
Their point was that Mao Zedong Thought was very good because it developed Marxism-
Leninism through revolutionary practice. For example, Lin Biao mentioned China's anti-
Japanese war from 1937 to 1945 as a "victory for Marxism-Leninism and the thought of 
Mao Tse-tung." 140 
According to a Chinese Maoist, Ren Lixin, Mao Zedong was specifically significant 
because he was the first person who succeeded in keeping a socialist revolution alive while 
avoiding "revisionist" backsl~ding, an accomplishment which had been the aim of all the 
Chinese Marxist-Leninists in the past: 
The proletariat must use violent revolution to smash the old state apparatus and 
replace it with the proletarian dictatorship. However, the problems arising after 
the proletariat seize power, how to maintain and consolidate the proletarian 
137'Long live the victory of people's war!' in PR No.36, 3 September 1965, p.10. 
138·Put politics first, promote a new upsurge in industrial production' in PR No.19, 6 May 1966, p.27. 
139'Mao Zedong Sixiang guanghui puzhao quan shijie [The light of Mao Zedong Thought illuminates the 
whole world]' in RMRB, 4 October 1966, p.6. 
14o'Long live the victory of people's war!' in PR No.36, 3 September 1965, p.10. 
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dictatorship, how to prevent capitalist restoration, and how to pursue the 
socialist revolution through to the end, had never been solved by any of all the 
Marxist-Leninists of the older generation. The Marxist-Leninists had never been 
able to settle these problems, but the greatest Marxist-Leninist in the present 
era, our great leader, Chairman Mao, has solved those problems [ ... ].141 
In Hongqi, a Chinese general Yang Chengwu, insisted on Mao's contribution to Marxism-
Leninism in China as follows: 
Mao Zedong Thought instilled Marxism-Leninism into the masses, [ ... J.142 
Through advertising Mao's "great" success in the Chinese socialist revolution, which was 
said to be led by Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Maoists asserted that 
Mao Zedong was also the ideological leader of the international proletarian revolution. In 
June 1966, a Renmin Ribao editorial wrote: 
The reason why Chairman Mao enjoys extremely high prestige among the 
revolutionary people of the world is because he has, with the gift of genius, 
creatively, thoroughly, comprehensively and systematically developed Marxism-
Leninism. Mao Tse-tung's thought is not only an integration of the universal 
truths of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese 
revolution, but also an integration of the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism 
with the concrete practice of the world revolution.143 
Yang also claimed that Mao Zedong Thought was originally the same as Marxism-
Leninism.144 A Renmin Ribao editorial wrote: 
The nature of Marxi~m-Leninism is criticism and revolution. Its basic point is 
the necessity of criticism, struggle and revolution.145 
141 
'Zhengan shijie de wenhua dageming [The earth-shattering great cultural revolution]' in RMRB , 22 April 
1967, p.3 . 
142
'Dashu teshu weida tongshuai Mao zhuxi de juedui quanwei, dashu teshu weida Mao Zedong Sixiang re 
juedui quanwei [Largely promote absolute authority of the great commander Chairman Mao, largely promote 
absolute authority of great Mao Zedong Thought]' in HQ No.16, 1967, p.35. 
143
'Mao Zedong Sixiang shi shijie renmin geming de dengta [Mao Tse-tung's thought--Beacon of revolution 
for the world's people]' in RMRB, 1 June 1966, p.4. (English translations for both the title and text are from 
PR No.23, 3 June 1966, p.6.) 
144 'Dashu teshu weida tongshuai Mao zhuxi de juedui quanwei, dashu teshu weida Mao Zedong Sixiang re 
juedui quanwei [Largely promote absolute authority of the great commander Chairman Mao, largely promote 
absolute authority of great Mao Zedong Thought]' in HQ No.16, 1967, p.37. 
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The CCP repeatedly insisted on the need for criticism and struggle during the Cultural 
Revolution. 
The Mao cult prospered through its claim to have raised Marxism-Leninism to a new 
level. Some Chinese said that Mao Zedong Thought was the "only" theory which continued 
to practise Marxism-Leninism. For example, Yang said that a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary 
was bound to be a Maoist: 
If you are a revolutionary and a Marxist-Leninist, then you must support the 
great leader Chairman Mao and must support invincible Mao Zedong Thought, 
[ ... ].146 
On the assumption that Mao Zedong Thought was the developed form of Marxism-
Leninism, a Renmin Ribao editorial declared: 
Only by strictly keeping Mao Tse-tung's thinking in command, can 
revolutionary people have a clear-cut and firm political direction, persistently 
maintain a vigorous revolutionary spirit, recognize objective laws through 
practice and work in harmony with these laws; only in this way can our socialist 
cause advance steadily and be ever victorious.147 
The effect of this was to suggest that non-Maoist communist parties were not really socialist, 
which h'-'-) a profound effect on international relations rhetoric by focussing attention on the 
failures of the Soviet Union (rather than capitalism). 
In order to indicate that Mao Zedong Thought enjoyed worldwide recognition as the 
"standard" Marxism-Leninism, Chinese publications printed many foreign comments which 
praised Mao Zedong as the _great Marxist-Leninist, and Mao Zedong Thought as pure 
Marxism-Leninism: 
[ ... ] all Genuine Marxist-Leninists of our era assimilate Mao Tse-tung's thought 
and take it as the guide to revolutionary action. (Editorial by Jacques Grippa, 
145
'Women shi jiu shijie de pipanzhe [We are critics of the old world]' in RMRB, 8 June 1966, p.l. 
146'Dashu teshu weida tongshuai Mao zhuxi de juedui quanwei, dashu teshu weida Mao Zedong Sixiang re 
juedui quanwei [Largely promote absolute authority of the great commander Chairman Mao, largely promote 
absolute authority of great Mao Zedong Thought]' in HQ No.16, 1967, p.30. 
147•1n putting politics first, one must constantly put Mao Tse-tung's thinking in command' in PR No.20, 13 
May 1966, p.43. 
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Secretary of the Central Committee of the Belgian Communist Party, published 
in the weekly La Voix du Peuple)l48 
Lenin and Mao Tse-tung are the two greatest men of the 20th century. It is 
wonderful that two such great men have emerged in one century. This has 
changed the face of the world. (The director of the Lebanese paper, Beirut Al-
Masa)l49 
Experience in the cultural revolution proves that Comrade Mao Tse-tung's 
thought is the highest expression of the creative development of Marxism-
Leninism in the present historical era. It is the most reliable guide for carrying 
forward the revolutionary struggle in all conditions and in all countries. (The 
Central Committee of the Italian Marxist-Leninist Movement in a recent 
communique) l 5 0 
Mao Tse-tung is as great as Lenin. He is the Lenin of our time and we love him 
dearly. (One old teacher at the Chinese exhibition of works of art in Arad, 
Rumania) l 5 1 
Moreover, some foreign communist parties declared that they would apply Mao Zedong 
Thought to revolution in their countries: 
The Peruvian Communist Party, when referring to the application of Marxism-
Leninism to the conc.rete conditions to the Peruvian revolution, includes Mao 
Tse-tung's thought in Marxism-Leninism.152 
148
'China's Great Cultural Revolution is Chairman Mao's magnificent and great achievement' in PR No.39, 
23 September 1966, p.20. 
149
'An account of the visits of foreign friends to the Museum of the Chinese Revolution' in PR No.40, 30 
September 1966, p.20. 
150
'The world's revolutionary people hail China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' in PR No.40, 30 
September 1966, p.27. 
151 'The hearts of the world's revolutionary people are with Chairman Mao' in PR No.43, 21 October 1966, 
p.15. 
152
'Peruvian Communist Party warmly hails victory of China's Great Cultural Revolution and of Mao Tse-
tung's thought' in PR No.39, 23 September 1966, p.21. 
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As we have seen thus far, Marxism-Leninism tended to be referred to in order to give 
the people an impression that Mao Zedong Thought was the correct and standard theory for 
the international proletarian revolution of the time. Even though this CCP propaganda might 
have largely targeted the promotion of the Cultural Revolution at home, the stress on Mao 
Zedong Thought as the apex of Marxism-Leninism also revealed a Maoist strategy to spread 
Mao Zedong Thought through the world. This was illustrated by the printing of foreigners' 
"favourable" comments on Mao Zedong Thought. (Needless to say, no unfavourable 
comments appeared.) In Chinese official publications, Mao Zedong Thought thus became 
the "universal truth" of the proletarian revolution. By trying to present an international rather 
than a Chinese framework for Maoism, the CCP wanted to imply that China was now the 
true inheritor of the traditions of Marxism-Leninism. 
2.2. Export of Mao cult and Mao Zedong Thought as having 
global support 
Maoist enthusiasm for developing the image of China 
Edgar Snow, an American journalist who was very close to Mao Zedong wrote in Red 
China today: 
Mao was part Leninist, part Stalinist---and all Chinese.15 3 
Chinese revolutionary leaders,_such as Maoists in the CCP and Red Guards, while "wishing 
to promote" the international proletarian revolution, were also interested in their country 's 
image and status in the world. In Chinese publications, although many articles and 
statements appeared advocating the necessity of world revolution, there were articles which 
revealed nationalist sentiment which regarded Mao-led China as a model revolutionary 
country. These articles, through praise for Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought, tried to 
153 Snow, Edgar, Red China today--revised and updated edition of The other side of the river (Random 
House, New York, 1970), p.635. 
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demonstrate that there was a favourable international image of China. What seemed to be 
emphasised was that Mao Zedong was the representative of China and that he was loved by 
people all over the world. There was little reference to revolutionary theory or strategies in 
some of these articles. 
Different groups of Red Guards published unofficially a number of different 
magazines, especially from 1967 to 1968. In these magazines, some of the Red Guard 
groups were keen to publicise the international popularity of Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong 
Thought. It also appears that those Red Guards believed that China was popular among the 
people abroad. However, the reality was that China's image was growing worse in non-left 
sections of the population in capitalist developed countries (non-Maoist sections of 
communist and socialist parties in some countries, such as Japan) and in the Soviet bloc, 
partly because Chinese foreign policy had become so radical. The Cultural Revolution was 
also criticised by many other countries and communist and socialist parties. Thus the Mao 
cult reached its peak in China when China was seen by most of the world as being difficult 
to deal with. 
In this first part of the section, I ·will examine the relationship between the Mao cult 
and nationalist expressions by Red Guards and the CCP in the early phase of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
Firstly, we will look at the cult of personality. There were Red Guard articles that 
spoke only of foreigners' "boundless love" for Mao Zedong, without any other content. In 
this way, Mao Zedong was portrayed as if he were a god to be worshipped, rather than as a 
commander or revolutionary 1eader. In a Red Guard paper, there was an article about a 
Tanzanian delegate who had met Mao Zedong in China. According to the article, after 
meeting Mao, the Tanzanian went back to his country leaving his hand unwashed and said to 
whoever he met, "Chairman Mao shook hands with me, now you shake hands with me!"154 
The article continued: 
154
'Mao zhuxi shi shijie geming renmin xinzhong de hong taiyang [Chairman Mao is the red sun in hearts 
of the world revolutionary people]' in Waishi Hongqi, 4 June 1967, p.4, in RGP Vol.13 , p.4405. 
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Another delegate went to Shaoshan (Mao's birthplace in Hunan Province) and 
specially brought back a package of sand from Chairman Mao's hometown as a 
souvenir. 155 
Another extreme story of the Mao cult was about an old Vietnamese man: 
Heroic Vietnamese people regard the Chairman Mao badge as the most precious 
thing in the world. Workers in a coastal defence harbour were working very hard 
one day in winter. Suddenly, an overseas Chinese worker carelessly dropped a 
Chairman Mao badge into the sea. At that moment, an old Vietnamese worker 
dived into the ice-cold sea with a splash, not taking the time to take off his 
clothes. He did not get the badge at the first dive so made a second dive after 
taking a breath at the surface of the water. In this way, it was only after three 
dives that he managed to find the glittering Chairman Mao badge. After going 
ashore, despite the fact that his whole body was frozen over so badly that its 
color had begun turning purple, he, with great effort, said to other workers, 
"Chairman Mao is the leader of the people of the whole world, I love him so 
much!"156 
This story may have been written mainly to encourage the Mao cult among overseas 
Chinese. But it still seems to also reveal the writer's intention of showing how deeply Mao 
was loved by the peoples of the world. In addition, by showing that the Vietnamese people 
loved China's leader too, the story implicitly tried to enhance the status of the Chinese 
people who declared loyalty to Mao. 
In Paris, an old French _ woman went to a Chinese exhibition. When a Chinese staff 
member spoke of"[ ... ] our great leader Chairman Mao[ ... ]," the woman said to the staff 
member, "What? Your Chairman Mao? No! Chairman Mao is not only yours, he belongs to 
all the people of the world!" 157 
155Ibid. 
156,Mao zhuxi a, shijie renmin reai nin! [Chairman Mao, the world people love you so much!]' in Pi Chen 
Zhanbao, l July 1967, p.2, in RGP Vol.11, p.3279. 
157Ibid. 
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Next, we will look at some Red Guard articles emphasising the fact that Mao Zedong 
was a Chinese and that Mao Zedong Thought was produced in China: 
China's red sun is rising! China has produced a Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong 
Thought and the concrete practices of the Chinese revolution are linked to each 
other. This is why, in China, this great country on earth, the revolution has 
succeeded [ ... ]. 15 8 
The above quote was attributed to an "American friend," named Rittenberg.159 
Today, in the East Asian region, around the famous Yangzi River, along the 
ancient Yellow River, there is a raging torch burning. She is the hope of all 
human beings, and the beacon of the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of 
every country! She is the eternal torch of Mao Zedong Thought! 160 
This revealed a portrayal of China as the "birthplace" of Mao Zedong Thought. Mao Zedong 
and Mao Zedong Thought were firmly linked with the image of China. The "correctness" of 
Mao's approach to revolution is given a direct relationship to China as a territory and nation. 
It is interesting to note why the Red Guard writer of the quote above used "she," but 
did not use either "it" or "he," to indicate Mao Zedong Thought. There are a few different 
reasons we can think of. First of all, the writer might have wanted to portray Mao Zedong 
Thought as a character who could strongly influence the peoples of the world. Then, why 
should it be female? One of the possible reasons is that the writer might have been careful 
not to "create" another "hero" other than Mao Zedong himself. Another is that the writer 
might have linked the image of Mao Zedong Thought with "motherland" China, whom the 
revolutionary peoples of the world should respect and rely upon. Or it can be said that Mao 
Zedong Thought was portrayed as the "goddess of victory" who would lead the peoples of 
the world to a victory in the international proletarian revolution. 
Lastly, we will look at Mao's "contribution" to the international "popularity" of 
China. Peking Review printed some stories aimed at showing improvements in China's 
15 8 
'Chuangchu yi ge hongtongtong de gongchanzhuyi xin shijie lai [Break through to a new red communist 
world]' in Hongqi , 21 May 1967, p.6, in RGP Vol.6, p.1603. 
15 9 Sidney Rittenberg 
l60'Mao zhuxi, quan shijie renmin xinzhong de hong taiyang [Chairman Mao, the red sun in hearts of the 
people of the whole world]' in Hongqi, 21 May 1968, p.4, in RGP Vol.6, p.1655. 
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image abroad. For example, there was an article about an experience of a Chinese medical 
team sent to Mauritania that happened to save a local baby's life. The baby's father, with his 
baby, visited the Chinese medical team a few days after an extremely delicate operation: 
Fondly caressing the child, the father kept muttering: "Chinois, Chinois 
(meaning Chinese)." A Chinese medical worker asked him curiously why he 
kept saying the word to his child. "But that's his name," the father replied. "My 
child was dying the other day and was saved by the Chinese medical team sent 
here by Chairman Mao. So I changed my child's name to 'Chinois' from that 
day." He then shouted enthusiastically: "Long live Chairman Mao!"161 
Another article in Peking Review said: 
People in the Asian-African countries are deeply aware from their own personal 
experience that only Mao Tse-tung's China can help them build their countries 
in such a disinterested way, that only the Chinese people nurtured on Mao Tse-
tung's thought can serve the people of the world heart and soul with such 
boundless warmth. They thank the Chinese experts and workers for their 
industrious efforts, and they express the deepest gratitude to Chairman Mao. 162 
Although the article incorporated revolutionary points of view, it obviously revealed Chinese 
Maoist sentiment which regarded Mao Zedong Thought as almighty in terms of serving to 
the peoples. 
The promotion of patriotic expressions by Chinese Maoists seems to have coincided 
with the Maoists' opposition to the USSR. The following articles seem to have been trying 
to portray the people of the US?R as now beginning to follow Mao Zedong, instead of the 
"revisionist" CPSU. 
[A] Soviet sailor told a Chinese comrade: "[ ... ]. Every time I think of him (Mao) 
I am unable to restrain myself from humming the tune 'The east is red. The sun 
rises. China has brought forth a Mao Tse-tung [ ... ]."'163 
l6 1'Thank Chairman Mao for sending us such fine doctors!' in PR No.47, 22 November 1968, p.18 . 
l6 2 'Internationalist fighters in the service of the world's people' in PR No.5, 27 January 1967, p.23. 
l63'The desire of the Soviet people and the people the world over' in PR No. IO, 8 March 1968, p.26. 
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A Soviet youth pointed out that Chinese revolutionary songs have encouraged 
the Soviet people to wage struggles. He said he would sing the praises of Mao 
Tse-tung's thought for ever.164 
These "facts" indicated that the CCP was trying to portray that the CPSU was losing its 
power even over the Soviet people. That was supposed to mean that Mao Zedong and the 
Chinese people were the new force to guide the world revolution. 
Thus, during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese publications printed many articles 
that were closely connected to the Mao cult. The Maoist point of view was that China was 
loved by the people of the world, because the Chinese people were good revolutionary 
models who were firmly led by the world's revolutionary leader, Chairman Mao. These 
articles seem to create the impression that there was enthusiasm among Chinese people to 
take on a role of socialist leadership in the world, instead of the former leader, the USSR. 
Export of Mao Zedong Thought and the Cultural Revolution 
From 1966 to 1968, the Chinese press ·and magazines extensively reported that Mao Zedong 
Thought had been spreading all over the world. 
From one continent to another, the revolutionary peoples, regardless of 
differences in nationality, language and colour, are united in their love for 
Chairman Mao and their earnest desire to study his works.165 
Many of the reports tried to show how deeply the people or the revolutionary organisations 
of other countries admired Mao Zedong and how firmly they resolved to follow Mao Zedong 
Thought. It seemed as if Mao Zedong Thought had largely affected the people of the world 
in terms of anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist struggles. As noted above, Mao Zedong was 
often said to have improved Marxism-Leninism. And his improvement was said to be 
breaking its link with imperialism which the Soviet Union had failed to do. 
l64Ibid., p.27. 
l65'The brilliance of Mao Tse-tung's Thought illuminates the whole world' in PR No.27, 1 July 1966, p.13 . 
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Even so, the CCP propaganda carefully avoided stating explicitly that China was the 
leader of world revolution. Although Mao Zedong Thought was claimed by the Chinese as 
the thought that led the revolutionary people of the world, the CCP did not describe China 
itself as a world leader. Neither did they clearly insist that the peoples of the world should 
follow Mao Zedong Thought. If they did, it would have violated the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, 166 especially "non-interference in each other's internal affairs ," 
among Asian countries. Instead, the claim to revolutionary leadership was implied. The 
press and magazines introduced a significant amount of praise of Mao Zedong Thought and 
of the Chinese people by foreign revolutionaries. It seemed as if China had m.any friends all 
over the world. 
However, the reality was quite different. Even though China established friendly 
relations with m.any foreign governments and organisations in early 1960s, the relationships 
grew cold and were almost broken off in the m.id 1967, largely because of the extremism. of 
the Cultural Revolution in China. The CCP rhetoric cam.e to focus on support for national 
liberation of the peoples from. their "oppressive" governments and hegemonic forces which 
were allied with US imperialism and/ot Soviet "revisionism." 
Asahi Shimbun claimed that, even though China was keen to export revolution 
verbally, the Chinese government did not explicitly claim to lead the revolutionary people of 
the world 167 --presumably to avoid arousing the hostility of foreign cout?-_tries. 
I will observe how the Chinese official and non-official press and magazines (both 
Chinese and English language) presented Mao Zedong Thought as the "universal" theory for 
the revolutionary peoples of the world to follow. From this we can see the ima,ge the CCP 
leaders wanted to maintain on the international stage, the international image that they wished 
to present to the Chinese population, and Red Guard enthusiasm over export of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
l66 A joint statement by Zhou Enlai and Nehru (India) at the Geneva Conference in July 1954. The statement 
mentioned; (1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-interference 
in each other's internal affairs, ( 4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence among Asian 
countries. 
167
'Chugoku no "Bunkaku yushutsu" gaiko [The "export the Cultural Revolution" diplomacy of China]' in 
Asahi Shimbun, 30 July 1967, p.3. 
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International publicity for Mao Zedong Thought was carried out by the CCP and 
other Chinese Maoists enthusiastically, although Foreign Minister Chen Yi was said by Red 
Guards to have opposed the export of Mao Zedong Thought. 168 In addition to making 
approaches to leftists, ultra-leftists and various other Maoist organisations abroad, the 
Chinese press used foreigners' words to introduce how "significantly" Mao Zedong 
Thought had influenced the people abroad in anti-imperialist struggles and how much the 
people of the world "loved" Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought. For example, 
Renmin Ribao quoted words by a Japanese Maoist: 
Mao Zedong Thought belongs not only to China, but also to the people of the 
world. It is a great power that would overthrow US imperialism and smash 
modem revisionism, and is a powerful, philosophical and theoretical weapon of 
the world people.169 
"A Guatemalan friend" said that Mao Zedong Thought was a "mental atomic bomb" and that 
Guatemalan people would "bring back Mao Zedong Thought" to their country in order to 
"promote" internal revolution there.170 "A Thai comrade" said: 
The people of my country cannot be without Mao Zedong Thought a moment, 
exactly as (we) cannot be without food and air.171 
Titles like "Mao Zedong Thought illuminates the whole world" and "Warmly hail the 
world's entry into a new era of Mao Zedong Thought" appeared everywhere in the Chinese 
press and magazines. Some illustrations show Mao's writings as extremely popular, 
especially among the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America.172 For example, one of the 
illustrations in Renmin Riha.a of October 1966 shows French people competing with others 
in buying books written by Mao at the "Chinese Hall" in a world exhibition in Paris. 
168
'Paohong Chenyi, dadaowuxiuquan, jiefang waishikou! [Bombard Chenyi, down with revisionist Wu, 
liberate the foreign affairs section!]' in Hongwei Zhanbao, 13 April 1967, p.4. in RGP Vol.8, p.2220. 
169
'Yazhou xuduo pengyou reqing gesong Mao zhuxi he Mao Zedong Sixiang [Many Asian friends warmly 
praise Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought]' in RMRB, 7 July 1966, p.4. 
170
'Yafeila pengyou shuo Mao Zedong Sixiang shi shiyong yu quan shijie de pubian zhenli [Asian, African 
and Latin American friends say that Mao Zedong Thought is suitable for the universal truth of the whole 
world]' in Peking Ribao, 23 March 1967, p.4. 
171 
'Quan shijie renmin tongsheng gechang hong taiyang [The people of the whole world sing together in 
praise of the Red Sun]' in RMRB, 10 January 1968, p.5. 
l 72For example, 'Mao Zedong Sixiang guanghui puzhao quan shijie [Light of Mao Zedong Thought 
illuminates the whole world]' in RMRB, 14 October 1966, p.6. 
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Another illustration in the same newspaper shows people walking in the mountains. The 
comment on the picture says that books written by Mao are very popular among Latin 
American university students. One of the people in the picture is holding a book written by 
Mao to his breast. 
Renmin Ribao published an interview with an American resident in Beijing. In the 
interview, the American said: 
Mao Tse-tung's Thought is the greatest treasure for revolutionaries everywhere. 
It is the invincible and indispensable weapon for revolutionaries everywhere and 
especially and of course in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Once this thought is 
disseminated and revolutionaries of the world have grasped it, victory in their 
revolution is certain. I 7 3 
To publicise an American's support for Mao Zedong Thought was to give the impression 
that US imperialism was isolated even within its own country, and also to show Mao 
Zedong Thought receiving support from all the peoples of the world without exception. The 
quote was meant to present Mao Zedong Thought as universal "treasure." 
Red Guards, of course, were devoted advocates of the export of Mao Zedong 
Thought. A group of Red Guards in the Beijing Institute of Foreign Languages criticised 
Chen Yi for saying "Mao Zedong Thought is thoroughly Chinese stuff, we won't bring it 
abroad" 17 4 and tried to prove his vvords were wrong. In their publicatio~, for instance, they 
reported a talk by a person from the Albanian Labour Party (The Albanian government was 
the only one which was explicitly allied with Maoism at the time.): 
We Albanian people all boundlessly love Chairman Mao. Each of us Albanian 
people would like to take some years from our own life span and give them to 
Chairman Mao. Long life to Chairman Mao! 175 
173
'Jen-min Jih-pao interview American comrades in Peking (1): great world significance of Mao Tse-tung's 
Thought' from Xinhua, 14 March 1967, in Survey No.3900, 16 March 1967, p.26. 
17 4
'Paohong Chenyi, dadaowuxiuquan, jiefang waishikou ! [Bombard Chenyi, down with revisionist Wu, 
liberate the foreign affairs section!]' in Hongwei Zhanbao, 13 April 1967, p.4. in RGP Vol.8, p.2220. 
175
'Mao zhuxi a, shijie renmin reai nin! [Chairman Mao, the people of the world deeply love you!]' in Pi 
Chen Zhanbao, l July 1967, p.2, in RGP Vol.11, p.3279. 
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Moreover, Red Guard enthusiasm over export of the Cultural Revolution was shown in the 
following resolutions: 
First we will make China red from the inside out and then we will help the 
working people of other countries make the whole world red. I 7 6 
We Red Guards are not only staging an all-out rebellion on the domestic scene, 
but are ready to step into the international arena to fight to the end and make 
thoroughgoing rebellions together with the oppressed peoples and nations of the 
whole world. 177 
Based on Chairman Mao's thought, we will struggle against monsters, and will 
struggle for the whole of China and the people of the world. I 7 8 
We Red Guards have been struggling for Chairman Mao's great ideal ---
establishing communist societies in the whole world. (Mei Jianming, aged 20, 
Beijing Institute ·of. Geology )179 
Those Red Guards were firmly convinced that they were the vanguard of the world 
proletarian revolution and that the Chinese way of revolution should be applied also to the 
rest of the world. 
This Red Guard intention, however, was different from a general policy of the CCP. 
Although there were some CCP ultra-leftists (such as Yao Dengshan) who insisted on 
exporting the Chinese way 9f revolution, the CCP' s repeatedly expressed general line of 
world revolution was that each country should pursue revolution in its own way. 
176Strong, Anna Louise, Letters from China (New World Press, Beijing, 1966), quoted in 'China topics ,' 25 
October 1966, in China-Political-Cultural Revolution-General 1966/1967 (Australian Archives), Series 
No: A1838/280, Item No: 3107/2/20/7 Pt3, p.101. 
177 People's Daily, 9 September 1966, quoted in 'China topics,' 25 October 1966, in China-Political-
Cultural Revolution-General 1966/1967 (Australian Archives), Series No: A1838/280, Item No: 
3107 /2/20/7 Pt3, p.101. 
17 8'Koeihei to kataru [Talk with Red Guards]' in Al, Vol.8, No.43, 16 October 1966, p.12. 
l 79Pekin ni sumu Nihon no yujin koeihei ni kiku [Japanese friends living in Beijing interview with Red 
Guards] in JC No.5, 1967, p.82. 
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The publicity for Mao Zedong Thought in the Chinese press and magazines was 
combined with anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist propaganda. The CCP wanted to make 
close ties with as many anti-imperialist governments and organisations as possible, but most 
of the support for Mao Zedong Thought and praise of the Chinese people were from 
relatively small governments and organisations, and individuals. 
The popularity of Mao Zedong Thought was linked to the popularity of Mao himself. 
Peking Review in late 1967 introduced a number of episodes which happened in the Soviet 
Union: 
In Leningrad, a grey haired worker always shouted "Long live Mao Tse-tung!" in 
Chinese whenever he met a Chinese comrade [ ... ]. "I love Mao Tse-tung. He 
lives in my heart." Sometimes Chinese comrades heard the shout of "Mao Tse-
tung" in the streets in Soviet cities but could not see who was shouting.180 
When Soviet people got a picture of Chairman Mao or a badge with his profile, 
their faces, without exception, would beam with boundless happiness or they 
would cheer. 18 1 
We can see from comparison of these episodes with CCP denunciations of the CPSU a clear 
rhetorical distinction between "oppressive" governments and "oppressed" people which was 
a main component of Maoist writings. 
Mao's supposed importance was reinforced in the frequent descriptions of him as 
fulfilling various leading, educative and combative roles for the nation and its people. This 
passage from the Peking Review is typical: 
At 6:30 p.m., our great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great 
helmsman Chairman Mao, in high spirits and filled with pleasure, strode into 
the bright! y lit reception hall together with Comrade Lin Piao [ ... ] .18 2 
l80'The radiance of Mao Tse-tung's Thought illuminates the path of the Soviet people's revolution' in PR 
No.47, 17 November 1967, p.21. 
181 Ibid. , p.22. 
182
'Chairman Mao, the red sun in the hearts of the world's people, receives friends from all over the world' 
in PR No.42, 13 October 1967, p.8. 
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The Mao cult in the press and magazines became greater and greater. The title of the passage, 
"Chairman Mao, the red sun in the hearts of the world's people," shows a Maoist claim that 
Mao was not only the leader of faithful Chinese followers but also the leader of the peoples 
of the world. 
Even though it was Mao Zedong Thought and Mao himself and not the Chinese 
Communist Party that China urged the people of the world to follow, praise of Mao Zedong 
Thought and Mao also meant praise of the Party. China declared that the Chinese 
Communist Party was Mao Zedong's party: 
Our Party, founded and nurtured by Comrade Mao Tse-tung personally, is a Party 
armed with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's Thought, [ ... ]) 83 
From this it can be said that the CCP wanted to imply the image of China as a leader in the 
world revolution. 
Thus the Chinese press and magazines tried to spread the idea that Mao Zedong 
Thought and Mao were greatly respected by the people of the world. The image of China 
coincided with that of Mao; China was implicitly suggested to be the respected world leader 
in the anti-imperialist struggle. And the Red Guards were in a way influenced by the CCP 
rhetoric to regard themselves as favourable torchbearers of the world revolution. 
2.3. Chinese denunciations of JCP "revisionists" and praise for 
Japanese Maoists 
The influence of the split between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union in 1964 on other communist and socialist organisations in the world was 
enormous. The Japanese Communist Party was one communist party which was deeply 
affected by the rupture between the two big socialist powers. The dispute between the CCP 
and the JCP over Soviet participation in the international united front, especially during the 
l83'Long live Mao Tse-tung's Thought--In commemoration of the 45th anniversary of the founding of the 
Communist Party of China' in PR No.27, 1 July 1966, p.5. 
57 
Vietnam Wars, caused senous hostility between the two parties m early 1966.184 The 
Maoists of the CCP insisted that the CPSU should not be included in a united front against 
the United States, because, the Maoists claimed, the CPSU was also an enemy of the people 
of the world. Meanwhile, the JCP said that the CPSU should be regarded as an anti-
imperialist power. After the split at a meeting in the spring of 1966, relations between the 
CCP and the JCP deteriorated rapidly.185 
In this section, I will look at both Chinese denunciations of the "revisionists" in the 
Japanese Communist Party and Chinese praise for the Japanese Maoists in Chinese 
publications mainly of 1967. I will attempt to show that the Chinese denounced the J CP 
"revisionists" as being anti-Maoist, and praised them for being Maoist. This section will also 
partly show examples of the Chinese Maoist rhetorical strategy that was directed towards 
other "fraternal" parties and peoples. 
At first I will look at denunciations by the Chinese Maoists of the Japanese 
"revisionists." In 1967, there were two big "violent incidents" which showed the 
seriousness of the dispute between the CCP and the JCP. There was a clash between Maoist 
Chinese students and members from the Japanese Communist Party at Zenrin Hall in Tokyo 
in March 1967. Renmin Ribao thoroughly denounced "revisionists" in the JCP as being 
allied to the United States, the USSR and the Japanese government over the anti-Chinese 
campaign: 
It was by no means accidental that the revisionists in the Japanese Communist 
Party should have staged such a dirty performance at a time when U.S. 
imperialism, the revisionist leading clique of the C.P.S.U. and the reactionaries 
of all countries are frenziedly assailing China's great proletarian cultural 
revolution and whipping up a violent anti-Chinese campaign, and particularly 
immediately following repeated anti-Chinese atrocities committed by the Soviet 
revisionist leading clique [ ... ]. The anti-Chinese incidents engineered by the 
revisionists in the Japanese Communist Party wholly served the interests of the 
l 84Nakajima, Mineo, Nihon kyosanto to Chugoku kyosanto [The Japanese Communist Party and the 
Chinese Communist Party] (Nitchu Shuppan, Tokyo, 1981), pp.16-17. 
l 85Ibid., p.17. 
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Soviet revisionist leading clique and the reactionaries of the United States and 
Japan [ ... ]. People can now clearly see that the "united action" so vociferously 
advocated by the revisionists in the Japanese Communist Party is after all 
nothing other than open collusion with the U.S. imperialists, Japanese 
reactionaries and the Soviet revisionist leading clique. In this collusion the 
Japanese revisionists serve as their anti-Chinese villains! 186 
The article tried to criticise the Japanese "revisionists" from the aspect of the international 
anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist struggle. According to the article, the clash was not 
merely a matter between China and Japan. In emphasising the "alliance" among the 
"imperialist" United States, the "revisionist" Soviet Union, the "reactionary" Japanese 
government and the "revisionists" in the JCP, the CCP wanted to indicate that the 
"revisionists" in the JCP were not only the enemies of China alone but also the common 
enemies of the peoples of the world. By calling the Japanese "revisionists" "anti-Chinese 
... , " the article listed the "revisionists" in the same group as US imperialists and Soviet 
"revisionists" who had been repeatedly claimed to be anti-Chinese.187 In the CCP rhetoric, 
anti-China was supposed to mean anti-peoples, because, as the CCP had often described, 
Mao-led China was on the people's side in the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle. 
In early August 1967, there was a violent action at Beijing Airport by Chinese and 
Japanese ultra-leftists against two JCP members who were going to leave China for Japan 
via North Korea. One of the members was from the JCP Central Committee and had been in 
Beijing for two years, and the other had been an Akahata188 correspondent in Beijing. In 
response to a protest by ~he JCP, saying that the incident was supported by some 
"organisation related to the CCP,"189 a Renmin Ribao editorial, entitled "Kenji Miyamoto 
Group's betrayal" on 6 August 1967, criticised the JCP "revisionists." The article also 
186
'Strong protest against anti-Chinese atrocities committed by revisionists in Japanese C.P.' in RMRB , 11 
March 1967, translated in PR No.12, 17 March 1967, pp.24-25. 
l87For example, 'Anti-China rumour combine' in PR No.7, 10 February 1967, pp.30-31. and 'The Soviet 
revisionist renegades cannot stop the forward march of the Afro-Asian people's solidarity movement against 
imperialism' in PR No.9, 24 February 1967, pp.24-29. 
188The official organ of the JCP ("Akahata" means "red flag.") 
189
'Sunama, Konno ryo doshi ni taisuru pekin kuko de no shudan boko ni tsuite [About the mass violence 
in Beijing Airport against Comrades Sunama and Konno]' in Akahata, 6 August 1967, p.l. 
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emphasised that the group had shown its alliance with the US, the USSR and the Japanese 
government: 
The Kenji Miyamoto revisionist clique of the Communist Party of Japan 
[ ... (made a false statement about the matter) ... ]. This is another anti-China 
incident this clique has deliberately manufactured in close co-ordination with the 
U.S. imperialists, the Soviet revisionists and the reactionary Eisaku Sato 
government[ ... ]. Sure enough, the group has now actually recalled Sunama and 
Konno and thus laid down one of its cards against China, thereby once again 
joining all the other doughty warriors in anti-China activities in an attempt to 
solicit rewards from the U.S. imperialists, Soviet revisionists and Japanese 
reactionaries [ ... ]. The Miyamoto group's frantic opposition to China is entirely 
against the will and wishes of the masses of the Japanese people. By serving as 
willing anti-China pawns of U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and the Sato 
government and grossly betraying the Japanese people's revolutionary cause, the 
group has joined the ranks of the new scabs of our time.190 
The articles revealed the CCP' s rhetorical strategy which determined that whoever opposed 
Mao, that is, whoever did not oppose the "revisionist" Soviet Union, would be regarded as 
being in alliance with the enemy of the world people, the United States. 
Red Guards criticised the "revisionists" in the JCP even more harshly. The rhetoric 
of their attacks was quite emotional and it clearly showed the Red Guards' devotion to Mao. 
The denunciation extended to calling the Secretary of the Japanese Communist Party, 
Miyamoto Kenji, "utterly stupid": 
This bastard Miyamoto Kenji had repeatedly attacked our country's Red Guards, 
distorted the situation of the Japan-China Parties Conference, announced the anti-
China statement, and openly put down the reddest sun in the Red Guards' hearts, 
Chairman Mao. [ ... ]. Miyamoto Kenji and your ilk, you stupid bastards, listen 
carefully with your damn ears, whoever opposes Chairman Mao should be 
l90'Kenji Miyamoto Group's betrayal' in RMRB, 6 August 1967, translated in PR No.33, 11 August 1967, 
pp.17-18. 
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overthrown! We will hit you on your damn heads with our iron fists stretching 
to Tokyo! [ ... ] (if you are) anti-imperialist, (you) must be anti-revisionist. 
Therefore we have to oppose the Soviet revisionism! We have to overthrow 
Brezhnev! We have to hit Kosygin on his damn head! Are you feeling bad!? Once 
we hit the Soviet revisionists, your hearts will be in pain! (You are linked to 
each other.) [ ... ] Miyamoto Kenji, (you are so) shameless, miserable and 
cheeky! 191 
How threatening to them (the "Miyamoto clique") the violent revolution and 
armed struggle are! They (the "Miyamoto clique") are shouting stuff like 
"following blindly" and "dogmatism." In short: they are against the Japanese 
people's learning Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, thus they bring 
the revolution of the Japanese people into the orbit of revisionism. They have 
already degenerated into "extremely stupid bastards" who are only thinking of 
"getting the majority of the votes under the dictatorship of the capitalist," and 
"traitors" and "pedants" who "cheat workers"! 192 
Next, I will look at Chinese praise for the Japanese Maoists and people in Chinese 
publications. The following article in Peking Review gave high praise to the Japanese 
Maoists, who had withdrawn from the "revisionist" JCP and established their own 
"prefectural committees of the JCP." The main reason the article spoke very highly of the 
Japanese Maoists was that they supported and devotedly followed Mao Zedong Thought in 
their "struggle against the re~ctionaries and revisionists." Even though the article seems to be 
praising the Japanese Maoists at first glance, in actuality it merely showed Chinese support 
for Mao Zedong Thought: 
Holding high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, the Japanese 
revolutionary Left are rebelling in a big way against the U.S. and Japanese 
l9 1'Gongben Xianzhi hundan touding [Miyamoto Kenji, utterly stupid]' in Hongqi , 2 October 1967, p.3 , in 
RGP Vol.6, p.1537. 
l9 2 'Chuochuan Gongben Xianzhi de huapi [Pierce Miyamoto Kenji's disguise]' in Hongqi , 8 March 1967, 
p.2, in RGP Vol.6, p.1548. 
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reactionaries and the Soviet and Japanese revisionists. [ ... ]. A striking feature of 
the Japanese revolutionary Left and progressive organizations is their boundless 
love for Chairman Mao and their absolute faith in Mao Tse-tung's thought. They 
take Mao Tse-tung's thought as the guide to their action and study and apply 
Chairman Mao's works creatively in the course of struggles. [ ... ]. China's great 
proletarian cultural revolution has greatly inspired the rebellious spirit of Japan's 
revolutionary Left. [ ... ]. Despite the joint efforts of the U.S.-Japanese 
reactionaries, the Soviet revisionists and the Miyamoto group to suppress the 
Japanese revolution today, and despite the many difficulties and problems still 
confronting the Japanese revolutionary Left, the radiance of Mao Tse-tung's 
thought is illuminating the forward path of revolution in Japan [ ... ].193 
In March 1967, a group of ten Japanese leftists, including the wife of the former 
General Secretary of the JCP, visited the Red Guards of Beijing Aeronautical Engineering 
Institute for an exchange. In praise of the Japanese Maoists, a Red Guard article pointed out 
their devotion to the Cultural Revolution and Mao, but did not, for instance, explain how the 
Japanese Maoists had been fighting against the Japanese "revisionists": 
[They] have come! The wife of Tokuda Kyuichi, at the advanced age of 70, [ ... ] 
with her face glowing with health, waving the very red Words of Chairman 
Mao, slowly walked up on the platform. "Arise, prisoners of starvation! Arise, 
the suffering people of the whole world! Our righteous indignation is burning 
[ ... ]." [ ... ]. Yokogawa Jiro with a mane of grey hair gave a brilliant talk. He 
praised highly grea~ Mao Zedong Thought, spoke highly of China's Cultural 
Revolution and Red Guards, and gave each red-banner fighter an exceedingly 
lively vivid political class. [ ... ]. A red-banner fighter representative well said, 
"Although our languages and nationalities are different from each other, our 
hearts are beating for the same purpose, which is --- to realise communism in 
the whole world!" [ ... ] the red-banner fighters gave the Japanese friends shining 
souvenir badges of Chairman Mao and red-banner armbands which have gone 
l 93 'Japanese revolutionary Left grows rapidly in struggle' in PR No.36, 1 September 1967, pp.24-26. 
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through battle. China's young Red Guard generals and Japan's old anti-
imperialist and anti-revisionist heroes, hand in hand, shoulder to shoulder, hearts 
linked together, firmly believe, "Today, we met in Beijing, but sometime in 
future we are sure to meet in the Japanese people's Tokyo." 194 
The following paragraph clearly illustrates how much the Red Guards valued the 
application of Mao Zedong Thought to the Japanese revolution: 
In their struggle, the Japanese people have experienced deeply the great meaning 
of Mao Zedong Thought. They have organised a number of small groups and 
classes for studying Chairman Mao's writings. They love reading books written 
by Chairman Mao best, and deeply love Chairman Mao.195 
In a round-table talk between six Red Guards and five young Japanese Maoists in 
Beijing on 7 February 1967, some of the Red Guards gave messages to the Japanese people, 
and expressed their wish to "support" the Japanese people's struggle: 
We are very much interested in the Japanese people's revolutionary struggle. We 
will stand by the Japanese people's side forever, and support the Japanese 
people's anti-US patriotic struggle and anti-revisionist struggle. (Shi Wenjie, 
aged 21, Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Engineering)l96 
In the midst of great violent change, great diversification and great reorganisation 
of the whole world, we have to fight persistently against imperialism, 
revisionism and every country's reactionaries and win a new victory for the world 
revolution by uniti.qg ourselves with the people of Japan and the peoples of the 
world. (Liang Xingbao, aged 26, Beijing Institute of Mining Industry) 197 
The Red Guards tried to portray the image that they were keen not only to pursue the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution, but also to give support for revolutions abroad, including 
l 94 'Tong Riben fanxiu zhanshi huanju yitang [With Japanese anti-revisionist fighters, happily gather under 
the same roof]' in Hongqi, 21 March 1967, p.4, in RGP Vol.6, p.1557. 
195
'Chuochuan Gongben Xianzhi de huapi [Pierce Miyamoto Kenji's disguise]' in Hongqi , 8 March 1967, 
p.2, in RGP Vol.6, p.1548. 
l 96'Pekin ni sumu Nihon no yujin koeihei ni kiku [Japanese friends living in Beijing interview Red Guards]' 
in JC No.5, 1967, p.83. 
197Ibid. 
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revolution in Japan. The Chinese revolutionaries' image, which is revealed in the messages 
above, is that they are "friends" of the Japanese people and the peoples of the world. In the 
interview, there was no image of the Red Guards trying to "lead" revolutions abroad, except 
by exporting Mao Zedong Thought. 
Lastly, I will look briefly at Chinese Maoists' actual intervention in anti-imperialist 
and anti-revisionist struggles in Japan, in order to show an example of contradiction between 
Chinese rhetoric and action in Maoist revolutionary policy on foreign countries (but, as we 
have seen, there was also contradiction within rhetorical strategies). 
An article written by Miyoshi Hajime, a Japanese Maoist who met Mao Zedong in 
Beijing in early 1966, showed the Maoist way of struggling against the common enemies by 
forming a firm unity among the people. Mao talked to some Japanese Maoists who visited 
him from Japan: 
All of you (both those who have actively fought through the passport struggle 
and those who have not) have to unite. Who tried to bother you about your visit 
to China? You know (who they are) very well, don't you? To struggle against 
those who interfere with you, you must unite.19 8 
Thus Mao tried to be rid of a minor conflict among the Japanese Maoists, without criticising 
those who did not try hard to get their passports for this trip to China. To unite peoples 
against the common enemies (both imperialists and revisionists) was the Maoist way of 
pursuing a revolution. Mao directly indicated how to struggle with common enemies, while 
an international united front came to be less emphasised once the Cultural Revolution began 
soon after this. The extract above can be seen as an example of direct instructions of Maoist 
revolutionary policy which were given to foreign "revolutionaries." Strictly speaking, this 
contradicted the CCP' s claimed revolutionary strategy which held that; revolution in each 
country should rely on its own people. But the quote perhaps also shows that Mao would 
give moral support for revolutions abroad. 
198'Mo shuseki ni aeta yorokobi [Joy of having finally met Chairman Mao]' in JC No.2, 1966, p.27. The 
Japanese government was reluctant to issue the Japanese Maoists' passports. The writer of the article said that 
Mao knew that there had been some unpleasant feeling between those who had tried hard to get their 
passports and those who did not try hard enough. 
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Both CCP Maoists and Red Guards were in actuality verbally interfering other 
countries' revolutions. The Red Guards portrayed their stance as respecting and supporting 
the Japanese and other countries' revolutions, even though the extreme rhetorical 
denunciations of the Japanese "revisionists" were done by the Red Guards. The Chinese 
criterion for distinguishing between enemies and allies abroad was whether or not they 
followed Mao Zedong Thought, which regarded both the United States and the Soviet Union 
as the enemies of the world revolution. The Chinese Maoists thus distinguished between 
Japanese enemies and Japanese allies by the same standards that they did Chinese enemies 
and Chinese allies. The Chinese Maoists, those in the CCP and the Red Guards, seemed to 
be wishing to lead the Japanese revolutionaries through applying Mao Zedong Thought to 
the revolution in Japan, even though this leadership was rhetorical. 
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Chapter Three: 
China's self-image 
3.1. The world revolution in the Chinese context 
From the mid 1960s to the late 1960s, the Chinese press showed its unique points of view 
on China's role in the international anti-imperialist struggle. Firstly, it presented China itself 
as the biggest obstacle to U.S. imperialism. Secondly, it implied that China had become the 
centre in the international anti-imperialist forces, after the split with the Soviet Union. 
Thirdly, it declared that Mao Zedong Thought, which, it claimed, had developed Marxism-
Leninism, 199 was the only principle that all the revolutionaries of the world should follow in 
their anti-imperialist struggles. These points of view appear to indicate that Chinese 
communist leaders and theorists strove for a high status on the international stage by using a 
rhetoric that distinguished China from the capitalist and Soviet worlds. Even though it is 
quite usual for a country to try to achieve a more important international role, the Chinese 
case was significant in terms of the contradiction in its rhetoric. For China, the world 
revolution not only meant defeating imperialism, but also meant improving Chinese status in 
the world. Through observing Chinese propaganda, this section will examine the CCP' s 
nationalistic intentions in promoting the international anti-imperialist struggle. 
Socialist China had long insisted that US imperialism was the biggest enemy of the 
people of the world. 200 Therefore the Chinese repeatedly advocated that the international 
anti-imperialist struggle should be pursued by a worldwide united front. This was the CCP's 
line before the Cultural Revolution began in mid 1966. Even though China was supposed to 
199For example, 'Long live Mao Tse-tung's Thought' in PR No.27, 1 July 1966, p.5. 
200For example, 'Direct spearhead of struggle against U.S. imperialism' in PR No.17, 23 April 1965, p.12. 
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be just one of the many anti-imperialist powers of the world, the Chinese tended to refer to 
themselves as the most powerful enemy of the United States: 
We should at no time forget that U.S. imperialism regards New China as the 
biggest obstacle to its policy of aggression and war.201 
China is a great revolutionary country. The Chinese people are persevering in 
their socialist revolution and socialist construction at home, and they firmly 
support the revolutionary struggles of all oppressed people and oppressed nations 
abroad. Precisely for this reason, U.S. imperialism regards China as the principal 
obstacle in the way of its policies of war and aggression in Asia and of the 
realization of its "global strategy. "202 
Wherever there is struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, the Chinese 
people never fail to lend their support. This stand of the Chinese people will not 
be altered, whatever the circumstances. This is in fact the true reason 
why U.S. imperialism hates China so bitterly. 203 
The Chinese leaders apparently accepted the possibility of a direct war between China 
and the United States after the escalation of the US bombing of North Vietnam in 1965: 
We must be prepared for a war they (U.S. imperialists) may start at some later 
date, and be even more prepared for an early war; we must be prepared for a 
small-scale war and even more for a large-scale war. 204 
It seems as if the Chinese. leaders wanted to imply "revolutionary" China's greatness, 
through referring to its being the main target of US imperialism. A particular tense situation 
by the heavy involvement of the US into the Vietnam War might have also affected this CCP 
rhetoric. 
20l'Hold high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and courageously drive ahead' in PR No.40, 1 
October 1965, p.10. 
202'The war threat of U.S. imperialism must be taken seriously' in PR No.15, 8 April 1966, p.7. 
203'Refuting Bundy' in PR No.9, 25 February 1966, p.10. 
204'The war threat of U.S. imperialism must be taken seriously' in PR No.15, 8 April 1966, p.7. 
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However, in actuality, China avoided becoming involved in a war with the United 
States. Gordon H. Chang observed: 
Behind the bombastic language Lin (Biao) was actually maintaining (in his 
article, "Long live the victory of people's war!")205 that the Vietnamese and 
other revolutionaries could rely on their own efforts and resources to attain 
victory, as the Chinese Communists had done. They should not expect 
supportive intervention from outside. In other words China would not directly 
involve itself in Vietnam.206 
The CCP became independent from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union m 
terms of anti-imperialist policy, and tried to be the leader of the socialist camp and the "Third 
World" after the split of the two parties in the mid 1960s. The more the CCP proclaimed its 
radical policy against the United States, the deeper the gap between the two parties became. 
The USSR, which was harshly denounced by the CCP for pursuing a revisionist way 
through "peaceful coexistence" with the United States, allowed the CCP to try to promote 
themselves in the socialist camp and the "Third World." Against the "betrayal" of the CPS U, 
the CCP declared that it would not hesitate to give support for anti-US struggles in any 
country: 
Our people shoulder the proletarian internationalist obligation of supporting the 
people of all countries in their struggle against U.S. imperialism and its 
lackeys.207 
It seems that, in order to rmpress the rest of the world even more, the Chinese press 
emphasised that China would also devote itself to anti-US struggles abroad. Just before the 
outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, Peng Zhen, then member of the Political Bureau of the 
Central Committee of the CCP and Mayor of Beijing, declared: 
The Chinese people will spare no sacrifice in resolutely performing their 
proletarian internationalist duty .208 
205The article was published in September 1965. 
206chang, p.270. 
207 'Hold high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and courageously drive ahead' in PR No.40, 1 
October 1965, p.10. 
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In addition, Renmin Ribao editorial wrote: 
In supporting the just struggle of other peoples, China is only fulfilling its 
internationalist obligation and will never ask for any reward from others.209 
It can be said that the Chinese media implied that China had become the new leader of the 
international anti-imperialist struggle, by contrasting China's "strong faith in the world 
revolution" with the "betrayal" by the former leader, the Soviet Union. The USSR was 
always in the Chinese leaders' minds when it came to the world revolution through the anti-
US struggle. In order to gain higher status in the world, the CPSU, not US imperialism, 
was supposed to be the biggest target for the CCP to "defeat." 
A Red Guard article regarded the Chinese revolution as having the same importance 
as the October Revolution in Russia of 1917, and the Cultural Revolution intensified this 
rhetoric: 
The victory in the" October Revolution" and the Chinese revolution ushered in a 
new century of a regime which allowed the proletariat and other working peoples 
to seize power with violence. "Political power grows out of the barrel 
of a gun." For power struggles of the unliberated and oppressed peoples and 
oppressed nations, this has set up a shining example and has shown a direction 
to advance forward. 21 O 
The article implied that China had inherited the spirit of the October Revolution, which was 
the first victory of socialism by armed force. The Maoists thus tried to justify their insistence 
that it was the Chinese way that the revolutionary people all over the world should follow. 
Application of Mao Zedong Thought to the world revolution was another thing that 
China attempted, in terms of promotion of the national status. Lin Biao, the then Vice-
Chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP, Vice-Premier and Minister of National 
Defence, wrote in his article, "Long live the victory of people's war!": 
208'Direct spearhead of struggle against U.S. imperialism' in PR No.17, 23 April 1965, p.13. Peng Zhen 
later became a victim of the Cultural Revolution. 
209,A major victory for China's foreign policy of peace' in PR No.18, 29 April 1966, p.11. 
210•ouanjian zai yu duoquan [The key is in seizing power]' in Dongfanghong, 22 January 1967, p.2, in RGP 
Vol.13, p.4046. 
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Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war is not only a product of the 
Chinese revolution, but has also the characteristics of our epoch. The new 
experience gained in the people's revolutionary struggles in various countries 
since World War II has provided continuous evidence that Mao Tse-tung's 
thought is a common asset of the revolutionary people of the whole world. 211 
He implied in the article that Mao Zedong Thought was the best strategy for the world 
revolutionaries to pursue. The following story showed both Mao's "superiority" to the 
CPSU in leading the world revolution and the "greatness" of Mao Zedong Thought: 
On their way to China, Norwegian friends of a trade union delegation were asked 
at Moscow airport whether they had any weapons with them. They replied, "Yes, 
we have," and each took out of his pocket a copy of Quotations from Chairman 
Mao Tse-tung. This gave the Soviet revisionists quite a shock. During their stay 
in China, these Norwegian friends always carried their Quotations with them. 
They described this book as the weapon of all revolutionaries and the guarantee 
for victory in the world revolution. The people of the world would certainly win 
their liberation provided they master the thought of Mao Tse-tung, they said.212 
To the Maoists, China was not merely one of many revolutionary powers 1n the 
world any more. China was supposed to be the leader of the world revolution. The Maoists 
assumed that the USSR, which used to provide a good model for the construction of 
socialism, had changed to become one of the enemies that the people of the world had to 
attack. The image of China which is revealed in the articles above is that, with the leadership 
of Mao Zedong, China bec;ame the most resolute anti-imperialist power in the world. 
According to the articles, other countries should also apply the revolutionary strategy based 
on Mao Zedong Thought, because the history of people's wars all over the world had 
proved Mao Zedong Thought to be the only "guarantee for victory in the world 
revolution. "213 
211 •Long live the victory of people's war!' in PR No.36, 3 September 1965, p.9. 
212'Chairman Mao, revolutionary people of the world will always follow you!' in PR No.l , 3 January 1968, 
p.39. 
213Ibid. 
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3.2. Peaceful and militant images 
China in the 1960s tried to impress the rest of the world with its contrasting peace-loving 
and revolutionary images. The split with the USSR gave the CCP an opportunity to improve 
China's status in the socialist camp. But it also created anxiety over national security. China 
continued the struggle against US imperialism, but chose to do so without the support of the 
USSR, and within certain limits. The CCP was careful not to provoke the United States into 
hostility against China. China's anti-imperialist policy in the 1960s remained relatively 
moderate in practice, with the exception of the summer of 1967. Yet Chinese propaganda in 
publications showed both peaceful and militant images of China. This propaganda pushed 
nationalistic rather than revolutionary ideas. 
Chinese leaders tried to skillfully balance the country's peaceful and militant images 
tactically. I will look briefly at the Sino-Indian boundary dispute as an example of CCP 
rhetorical strategies in the early 1960s. 
But before examining CCP rhetorical strategies over the boundary question, I should 
refer briefly to trends in Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations from the late 1950s to the 
early 1960s. Beijing's hostility against New Delhi greatly increased in 1959 when Nehru 
received the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader who had fled from Chinese-occupied 
Tibet, with respect.214 Shortly after the Dalai Lama's escape, a military clash between China 
and India occurred. China was unhappy when the Soviet Union only expressed "regret" at 
the clash, because that meant that the USSR, a powerful socialist country, neither supported 
socialist China nor denounced "bourgeois" India. 21 s The CCP came to feel a sense of crisis 
that New Delhi and Moscow were becoming closer to each other. Finally, ideological 
arguments between Beijing and Moscow began in 1960. However, at this stage, the Sino-
Soviet disputes were not thought to be serious, and were not generally known. 
214uno, Kobayashi and Yabuki (eds.), p.229. 
215Ibid., pp.229-230. 
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As V. P. Dutt has suggested, China wanted the boundary question between the two 
countries dealt with within the context of inter-Asian solidarity.21 6 From a Chinese point of 
view, that way would be more effective in drawing other Asian countries' attention to anti-
US united front policy than dealing with the problem as just a matter for the two countries. It 
seems that in that way China tried to impress upon the rest of Asia an "aggressive" image of 
US imperialism which was pulling the strings in India,217 as well as to reduce Beijing's 
hostility with New Delhi. 
The Indian government became closer to both the United States and the Soviet Union 
in the early 1960s.21 8 A Peking Review article claimed that the amount of US aid to India 
became much bigger after India started its supposed anti-China campaign in 1959.21 9 In 
addition, a Renmin Ribao editorial showed statistical "evidence" of US aid (from 1949 to 
July 1962) to India, in order to indicate that the annual average amount of aid was much 
higher after the "Nehru government had stirred up the anti-China campaign" than before ( the 
article claimed that the Nehru government had begun turning to the US side in 1956).220 
Beijing was not happy with New Delhi gradually becoming closer to the US and 
USSR, but China showed "tolerance" on the boundary dispute at first: 
China and India, as two big powers in Asia as well as two world powers, need 
all the more to live amicably with each other and make valuable contributions to 
the cause of Asian-African solidarity and world peace. Proceeding precisely from 
the vital interest of the Chinese and Indian peoples and the interest of world 
peace, the Chinese Government has always held that the present boundary 
dispute between China and India is only a question of a temporary and partial 
nature, and should be settled fairly and reasonably in accordance with the Five 
21 6'Dutt, V.P., China's foreign policy (Hindustan Scientific Press, Delhi, 1964), p.208. 
217 For example, Loomba, Joanne F., 'U.S. aid to India 1951-1967--A study in decision-making' in Grover, 
Verinder (ed.), International relations and foreign policy of India No.6--USA and India's foreign policy 
(Deep&Deep Publications, New Dahli, 1992), p.506. 
218Barnouin and Yu, p.73. 
219•u.s. "aid" and India's anti-Chinese campaign' in PP No.43, 26 October 1962, p.15. 
220'More on Nehru's philosophy in the light of the Sino-Indian boundary question' in RMRB, 27 October 
1962, translated in PR No.45, 2 November 1962, p.17. 
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Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the spirit of mutual understanding and 
mutual accommodation, and through friendly consultations.221 
The statement above shows a Chinese portrayal of China as a major power in Asia and the 
world, and a peace-loving nation. The statement also reveals an intention to deal with India 
as a powerful country like China. The CCP was afraid of strong links developing between 
India and the Soviet Union. China the ref ore did not want to provoke India into becoming 
seriously hostile to China. 
When heavy military clashes between China and India in the border areas were 
reported in 1962 and 1965, China claimed that India was the first to attack.222 (India said 
the opposite.) And the CCP showed its militancy in a veiled way: 
It (the Indian government) must immediately stop its intrusions and 
provocations against China, or else the Chinese side will give it such 
punishment as it deserves. 223 
In this extract, China's stance was portrayed as defensive and assumed a moral right to 
"punish." The defensive language indicated that China did not want to be seen as a threat, 
especially in Asia, after China had used armed force in reality. To allay "Third World" 
countries' fear of China, the CCP presented an image that the Chinese people loved peace, 
and that military action was always a last resort for China. China spoke as if China's efforts 
to maintain the policy of "peaceful coexistence" among Asian and African countries were 
being attacked by the Indian government's pro-imperialist and pro-revisionist policies. A 
Renmin Ribao editorial said: 
All who are concerned with Afro-Asian solidarity and Asian peace, hope that the 
Indian Government will not, on the strength of U.S. imperialist aid, cling to a 
blind faith in the use of force to settle the Sino-Indian boundary question. [ ... ]. 
For the sake of Afro-Asian solidarity and the common interests of Afro-Asian 
countries in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism, leaders of many 
221'Statement of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' in PR No.SO, 15 December 1961 , p.18. 
222For example, 'It's Nehru who refuses to negotiate and who orders fighting' in PR No.43, 26 October 
1962, p.9. 
223'Strong protest against Indian troops' armed provocation' in PR No.SI, 17 December 1965, p.13. 
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Afro-Asian countries have exerted their influence and made positive efforts to 
promote the reopening of negotiations between China and India.224 
Both peaceful and militant images were used by the CCP to gain as many 
revolutionary allies as possible. China, on the one hand, had to be revolutionary and militant 
enough to attract the "oppressed peoples" of the world. In addition, in order to distinguish 
its "orthodox" Marxism-Leninism from Soviet "revisionism", the CCP kept insisting on the 
need for violence in anti-imperialist struggles. But on the other hand, the Chinese press also 
often emphasised their peace-loving image, because they wanted to indicate that it was world 
peace that China ultimately strove for. 
The usage of the two contrasting rmages was influenced by the Chinese 
government's ideas about their place in the world. For example, after a successful nuclear 
test in October 1964, the CCP repeatedly emphasised that China developed the nuclear 
weapon in the hope of world peace, because the CCP thought that China might look like a 
threat to the rest of the world, especially to "Third World" governments and revolutionary 
organisations: 
The people of the socialist countries and other peace-loving people all over the 
world, especially the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
are convinced that nuclear weapons in the hands of socialist China are a mighty 
force in defence of world peace. 225 
It (China's success in a nuclear test) is a great encouragement to the heroic 
Vietnamese people ~nd to all the revolutionary peoples of the world, as well as 
an important contribution to the defence of world peace.226 
Although the CCP had kept saying that the nuclear weapons of the imperialist was 
threatening world peace, it claimed that "nuclear weapons in the hands of socialist China" 
224'An unshakable principle' in RMRB, 10 December 1962, translated in PR No.50, 14 December 1962, 
pp.6-7. 
225'Break the nuclear monopoly, eliminate nuclear weapons' in PR No.44, 30 October 1964, p.5. 
226'China successfully conducts new nuclear explosion' from Xinhua, 28 December 1966, in PR No. l, 1 
January 1967, p.7. 
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would contribute to world peace.227 The Chinese media repeatedly explained that China's 
nuclear development was inevitable in order to gain world peace through worldwide anti-US 
struggle, and that China would never be the first country to use nuclear weapons. 
On occasions of announcement of nuclear tests, Chinese official publications printed 
acclaim from all over the world. However, as most of the acclaim was from less powerful 
governments, communist and socialist parties, other revolutionary organisations and 
individuals, it seemed clear that the CCP's worldwide united front policy against the United 
States was not working to the extent that they wished. As a result of this, there was an 
attempt to show how many friends China had, even printing acclaim from non-official 
foreign individuals, such as a "famous" Chilean artist.228 
The militant image was also important for the Chinese to gain allies. It was connected 
with the CCP's separation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was 
supposedly revisionist. China claimed itself as a devoted follower of Marxism-Leninism. 
And, as Steven M. Goldstein has asserted, the Chinese leaders wanted to avoid Soviet 
control over China in 1960s.229 The CCP tried to gain firm solidarity with the non-Soviet 
socialist camp, even though this was very hard to achieve. China's failure in holding the 
Second Afro-Asian Conference in 1965, when the majority of participants insisted upon 
Soviet participation, was one example that revealed the difficulty. China's hostility towards 
the USSR coincided partly with the strong Soviet influence on the socialist camp. 
The Vietnam War, although an actual threat to China's national security, provided the 
CCP with a good opportunity to get allies through publishing articles and statements 
showing China's militant attitudes against imperialism. Because of the Soviet stance towards 
the Vietnam War, China regarded the Soviet Union as a follower of US imperialism, and 
tried to get other countries involved in not only anti-US, but anti-USSR struggles, while 
227For example, 'Dapo helongduan, xiaomie hewuqi [Break the nuclear monopoly, eliminate the nuclear 
weapons]' in RMRB, 22 October 1964, p.1. 
228•zhuhe Zhongguo he shiyan chenggong [Celebrate success of China's nuclear test]' in RMRB, 22 October 
1964, p.5. 
229Goldstein, Steven M., 'Nationalism and internationalism: Sino-Soviet relations' in Robinson, Thomas 
W. and David Shambaugh (eds.), Chinese foreign policy--theory and practice (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1994), p.225. 
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Moscow was giving support to North Vietnam (The Soviet Union was being said by China 
to be seeking for a peaceful settlement of the War). 
The "militant Chinese armed with Mao Zedong Thought" were portrayed as the most 
reliable revolutionaries, who would undoubtedly defeat imperialism (This was stronger with 
the beginning of the Cultural Revolution). Renmin Ribao printed pro-Chinese comments 
from some Asian and African novelists in September 1966. A Syrian representative said that 
each Chinese had both a weapon, and a book written by Mao Zedong, in his/her hands, and 
that no one could defeat them.230 A "representative from Congo" told a Chinese journalist 
that China was the hope of the world proletariat, not only because the Chinese were well 
prepared for defeating imperialism thoroughly within the country, but also because the 
Chinese were keen to help other countries with proletarian revolutions.231 
China regarded itself as a rapidly growing power in the world, and its media 
presented its influence on the rest of the world, especially on "Third World" countries, to be 
enormous in terms of the world revolution. But national egoism was considered 
unacceptable by Chinese leaders. In Chinese media, statements about China's greatness 
supposedly written/described by foreign "revolutionaries" in foreign-language media were 
published instead. That was one of the main reasons the CCP was careful about image of 
China abroad. The CCP put great effort into building an international united front against 
imperialism, using both peaceful and militant imagery. 
However, after the mid 1960s, China began losing relatively powerful allies one after 
another. The Indonesian Communist Party collapsed in a coup d'etat in September 1965, 
and the JCP, which did not_ agree with the CCP on dealing with the CPSU line on an 
international united front, broke with the CCP in :tv1arch 1966. The CCP also lost support 
from the North Korean Labour Party in the same year. Apart from that, as we have seen the 
previous chapter, China's radical revolutionary policies reduced support from many other 
communist and socialist parties. Understanding the unfavorable situation, China came to 
230'Zhongguo shi quan shijie wuchan jieji de xiwang [China is a hope of proletariats of the whole world]' in 
RMRB, 14 September 1966, p.4. 
231 Ibid. 
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concentrate on supporting anti-imperialist armed struggles of smaller size in some foreign 
countries, such as the Philippines and Thailand. 23 2 
Both peaceful and militant images were thus used in the Chinese official media for 
the purpose of impressing the rest of the world with China's developing role on the 
international stage. Moreover, the CCP thought that anti-imperialist struggle by the rest of 
the world would assist China's national security. In the latter part of the 1960s, the Chinese 
media, mainly Peking Review, came to enthusiastically promote Mao Zedong Thought 
abroad, as the CCP felt itself becoming steadily isolated, even in the socialist camp. And this 
was associated with the stronger critique of revisionism--f ollowing the outbreak of the 
Cultural Revolution, which made criticism of non-Maoist policies more intense. 
3.3. Centre of the world revolution 
In the late 1960s, China wanted to portray itself as being at the centre of world revolution. 
Although the Chinese leaders tended to avoid saying this themselves, there were many 
statements, by foreigners and Red Guards, which praised China as the leader of the 
international anti-imperialist struggle. Chinese official propaganda avoided showing the 
Chinese people or leaders making such claim, but was happy to print them as coming from 
the mouths of foreigners. The number of such statements rapidly increased in Chinese 
publications in 1967 and 1968, when the Cultural Revolution reached a peak in terms of the 
"revolutionary" activities of tne Red Guards. Foreign statements giving high praise to China 
may have stimulated Chinese revolutionaries to feel even more confident and proud of their 
"leadership" in world revolution. Many articles written by Red Guards praised China for 
being the leader of world revolution. As we will see later in this section, some articles 
praised the Red Guards as the most serious revolutionaries in the world. 
China terminated diplomatic relations with many governments and lost friendly 
relations with other communist and socialist parties once the Cultural Revolution began. 
232uno, Kobayashi and Yabuki (eds.), p.337. 
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Even though China made every effort to get as many allies as possible in the first part of the 
1960s, the Maoist extreme "revolutionary" policy after 1966 resulted in the loss of even 
long-time friendships, such as those with the North Korean Labour Party and the JCP. The 
Cultural Revolution caused a break with the early 1960s by strengthening anti-revisionist 
rhetoric which affected foreign relations. Despite what was being said in Chinese 
publications, China was isolated. 
In this section, I will examine certain statements, mainly by foreigners and Red 
Guards, to further explicate the Maoist strategy of promoting the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution, rather than the world revolution, to Chinese revolutionaries. But the expected 
effect of these articles was supposed to be more than to encourage the enthusiasm of the 
Chinese people for "world revolution"; it seemed that to impress the rest of the world with 
the "greatness" of China was another important aim of the articles. 
There were quite a number of foreign statements declaring that China was 
contributing greatly to the world revolution: 
Today, China is the centre of the world revolution, Peking is the beacon of the 
world revolution[ ... ]. (By a Bunhese friend)233 
Socialist China has become the bulwark of the proletarian world revolution. (By 
a Japanese friend, Junichiro Ide)234 
We, all of us, every revolutionary in the world, should everywhere defend with 
blood and fire People's China, the vanguard of the proletarian revolution of the 
world, the base of the world revolution, [ ... ]. (Letter by Saturnino Paredes 
Macedo, General Secretary of Peruvian Communist Party)235 
233 'The world's people love Chairman Mao' in PR No.9, 24 February 1967, p.16. 
234 'China's Great Cultural Revolution has opened a new era in world history' in PR No.21 , 19 March 1967, 
p.25. 
235'China's Great Cultural Revolution is a big leap forward in the world revolution' in PR No.45 , 3 
November 1967, p.20. 
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A Cameroon fighter, Bally, [ ... ] said: "The great victory of the cultural 
revolution has turned China into a great, impregnable base for world revolution. " 
(By a Congolese (B)236 student, Bayonne)237 
Today Peking has become the centre of the world proletarian revolution [ ... ]. 
China's great proletarian cultural revolution not only concerns the future of 
China but also that of the world proletariat. (By Masayoshi Fukuda, a leading 
member of the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee (Left)23 8 of the Communist 
Party of Japan)239 
China has become the great bulwark of socialism and communism in the world, 
the mighty base of the world revolution, the standard-bearer of Marxism-
Leninism and the firm, faithful and steadfast defender of the people of all 
countries who are striving for freedom and national independence. (A message by 
Albanian Party and state leaders240)241 
Great China of Mao Tse-tung has shown by facts that she is the defender of the 
peoples, big and small, of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and of Europe in 
their struggle against the intrigues and plots of U.S. imperialism and Soviet 
revisionism. (By Enver Hoxha, the leader of the Albanian Party of Labour)242 
People's China no~ enJoys indisputable world popularity and prestige. The 
people of the world look with admiration and respect towards this great Asian 
socialist country which is the powerful bastion of the struggle against U.S. 
23 6Brazzaville 
237•world's revolutionary people acclaim the May 16, 1966 Circular' in PR No.22, 31 May 1968, p.25. 
238Maoist 
23 9'May 16, 1966 Circular inspires world's people in revolutionary struggle' in PR No.23 , 7 June 1968, 
pp.18-19. 
240Enver Hoxha, Haxhi Lleshi and Mehmet Shehu 
241 'Albanian party and government delegation visits China' in PR No.40, 4 October 1968, p.25. 
242'Comrade Enver Hoxha's important speech' in PR No.41, 11 October 1968, p.17. 
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imperialism and the main base area of the revolutionary movement. (By Organ 
of the Communist Party of Brazil, Classe Operaria)243 
These statements were supposed to indicate the great influence of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution not only on the anti-imperialist struggle in the rest of the world, but also on the 
world revolution. There were many foreign comments which described China as the centre 
of the world. Even though it was quite rare for Chinese leaders to openly praise China as the 
world leader, in December 1967, a "commentator" in Renmin Ribao wrote: 
The hearts of the world's revolutionary people are turned to China, the centre of 
the world revolution. No force whatsoever can prevent the People's Republic of 
China from playing its great role and exerting its great influence in international 
affairs. 2 4 4 
This extract appears to have shown the CCP appealing to the nationalist sentiments of 
Chinese revolutionaries. At the same time, this seems to have indicated the CCP' s 
confidence as one of the world powers. 
As the CCP expected, Red Guards expressed pride that their country was the "centre 
of the world." Some of them mentioned that China had become the focus of international 
attention: 
The hearts of the world's revolutionaries are turned to China, to Beijing, and to 
our most beloved great leader, Chairman Mao, [ ... ].245 
The establishment of the Beijing Revolutionary Committee in April 1967 was described as 
though it were the happiest thing to happen to the revolutionary people all over the world: 
Beijing is the place _ where, regarding Chairman Mao as its head, the proletarian 
revolutionary headquarters is, and is the strong fortress of the international 
proletarian anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism. The establishment of the 
Beijing Revolutionary Committee is a festival of the proletarian revolution of 
243'Chinese people are marching towards bright future' in PR No.43 , 25 October 1968, p.25. 
244 'China's great influence in the world is irresistible' in RA1RB, 30 November 1967, translated in PR 
No.50, 8 December 1967, p.21. 
245 'Yi daju wei zhong, gao da tuanti zhuyi [Regard whole situation as important, carry on the great mass 
doctrine]' in Dongfanghong, 22 February 1967, p.5, in RGP Vol.13, p.4057. 
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our country, and also is the happiest event of all the revolutionary people of the 
whole world. 246 
Another article said about the establishment of the Beijing Revolutionary Committee: 
In the heroic capital of our great homeland, the heart of the world revolution, 
Beijing, a world-shaking spring thunder has risen [ ... ].247 
The Red Guards described Beijing as "'Yan'an' of the world revolution,"24 8 because 
Yan'an had been respected, mainly by the communists, as the original place and centre of the 
Chinese revolution where the communists set out in their war against the nationalists. 
In addition, Red Guards also interviewed some "revolutionary" foreign residents in 
Beijing and printed their comments of praise in Red Guard papers. According to a Red 
Guard newspaper, Waishi Hongqi, an American resident in Beijing said: 
The whole world's proletariat and revolutionary peoples are all gazing at 
China.249 
The following extract showed "how the Red Guards were popular" among the 
revolutionary peoples of the world: 
The revolutionary rebellious spirit of Red Guards shakes the whole world! Many 
silk banners and fresh flowers have been sent [ ... (from revolutionary places in 
the world) ... ] and they express the world peoples' cherished desire: "Please pass 
our respects to the Chinese people and Red Guards, and tell them we will be 
standing together with them forever!"250 
These expressions give an impression of China as the most important part of the world 
revolution. That was the im_age that the CCP wanted to impress Chinese revolutionaries 
with. It was also the image that many Chinese revolutionaries had of their country. 
246'Guoji gongchan zhuyi yundong de xin kaige [A new song of triumph of the international communist 
movement]' in a combined issue by Xin Beida and Renda Sanhong, 20 April 1967, p.1 , in RGP Vol.5 , 
p.1415. 
247
'Hongse zhengquan wansui [Long live the red political power]' in a combined issue by Xin Beida and 
Renda Sanhong, 20 April 1967, p.2, in RGP Vol.5, p.1415. 
24 8•wuchanjieji zhuanzheng de xin pianzhang [A new chapter of the proletarian dictatorship]' in a combined 
issue by Xin Beida and Renda Sanhong, 20 April 1967, p.2, in RGP Vol.5, p.1415. 
249•yu Zhongguo de wuchan jieji geming pai bingjian zhandou [Struggle together with Chinese proletarian 
revolutionaries]' in Waishi Hongqi, 8 May 1967, p.4, in RGP Vol.13, p.4397. 
250'Qianjin! Yingxiong de hongweibing [Forward, heroic Red Guards!]' Xin Beida, 28 March 1967, p.4, in 
RGP Vol.5, p.1312. 
8 1 
This rhetorical strategy was not seen before the Cultural Revolution started. As we 
have seen in the early chapter, the CCP had previously tried not to give other countries the 
impression that China was wanting to claim itself as the leader of world revolution. 
At an interview with Red Guards by Japanese Maoists at the round-table talk m 
Beijing, the Red Guards told the Japanese as follows: 
The Cultural Revolution is a great revolution which is related to the destiny of 
the human beings of both China and the world. (Shi Wenjie, aged 21, Beijing 
Aeronautical Institution)251 
Red Guards act according to the teachings of Chairman Mao. They hold to the 
principles of persuasion and education, and convince others by talking reason. 
Last year, when Japanese friends came, to tell you the truth, I was anxious about 
their long hair. We were asked by some Japanese friends if it was OK to leave 
the long hair and long pants as they were. But we explained that it was a thing 
that they themselves should decide and that to defeat the "four olds"252 was to 
exterminate capitalist and revisionist thoughts persistently. We said that the 
strange hairstyle was a sign of the rotten American life style and that the 
revolutionary people and hard workers would value simplicity above everything 
else. The Japanese friends were deeply impressed and said, "Indeed you are right. " 
I heard that they had had a haircut soon after going home. (Zhu Aimin, aged 22, 
Beijing University)253 
The above quote portrays the.Red Guards as not giving orders to others. The above speaker 
claimed that what the Red Guards would do was to give others reasons and let the others 
make decisions by themselves. Although the speaker did not demonstrate any intention of 
impressing the Japanese Maoists with the Red Guard leadership, the quote indicates the 
speaker's pride in pursuing the revolution according to Mao Zedong Thought. The speaker's 
251 'Pekin ni sumu Nihon no yujin koeihei ni kiku [Japanese friends living in Beijing interview Red Guards]' 
in JC No.5 , 1967, p.81. 
252Qld thought, old culture, old custom and old tradition 
253'Pekin ni sumu Nihon no yujin koeihei ni kiku [Japanese friends living in Beijing interview Red Guards]' 
in JC No.5, 1967, p.74. 
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implicit point in the statement seems to be that the Red Guards were the best revolutionaries 
in terms of having grasped Mao Zedong Thought correctly and putting it into practice 
~ 
faithfully. (However, there p<o materials for me to be sure about the speaker's point of 
view.) 
Another Red Guard at the interview explained the Chinese point of view on the 
international role of the Cultural Revolution: 
The Great Cultural Revolution's great significance is, I think, that not only did 
it expose a handful of the Party realists on the capitalist road; thoroughly 
criticise and dismantle the bourgeois reactionary line; uproot feudalism, 
capitalism and revisionism; promote Mao Zedong Thought, preventing China 
from ever changing its colours; but it also contributed greatly to the work of the 
international communist movement and the world revolution. (Liu Zhichang, 
aged 28, Qinghua University)254 
The "betrayal" by the USSR was one thing that the CCP, through praising China as 
the world revolutionary leader, wanted to impress the rest of the world revolutionaries with. 
The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was taken as proof that the USSR was no 
longer the leader of world socialism. The Chinese, introducing a statement from Vanguard, 
which they claimed was the "Organ of the Communist Party of Australia," alluded to China 
replacing the USSR as revolutionary leader: 
The great victory of China's great proletarian cultural revolution [ .. . ] "stands in 
striking contrast to the dirty betrayal by the Soviet and Czech revisionist cliques 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat. While they go down in ignominy, the 
Chinese people hold up the great banner of Marxism-Leninism, the thought of 
Mao Tse-tung as never before."255 
Thus Chinese leaders' rhetorical attempts to stimulate the revolutionaries to the 
Cultural Revolution were shown in the Chinese publications. Using foreigners' high praise 
for China was supposed to be even more effective to promote the "revolutionary spirit" of 
25 4Ibid., p.82. 
255·rnauguration of revolutionary committees throughout China hailed by friends abroad' in PR No.40, 4 
October 1968, p.28. 
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the Chinese. The Red Guard pride was shown directly to the Japanese Maoists at the 
interview. For Chinese revolutionaries, the "fall" of the CPSU and "worldwide acclaim" 
towards the Cultural Revolution seemed to be the right "evidence" to believe that China had 
become the centre of the world revolution. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the account of China's place in the world in rhetoric in 
the 1960s. I argued that China's rhetorical strategies in the international struggles of anti-
imperialism and "world revolution" were influenced by a developing CCP construction of an 
international image of China. 
Firstly, it has been obvious that Red Guards, "the most devoted followers of 
Chairman Mao," were keen to export Mao Zedong Thought (Chapter Two). Although most 
Red Guard rhetoric fallowed that of the CCP, Red Guard revolutionary propaganda was 
generally more militant. According to the Red Guards, the world communist movement 
should be developed in accordance with Mao Zedong Thought. They believed themselves to 
be the model revolutionaries of the world. Some articles and speeches reveal the Red 
Guards' patriotic motivation for insisting on the export of Mao Zedong Thought. 
Some Red Guards' patriotism was partly influenced by CCP rhetorical strategies that 
tried to stimulate the people's pride in pursuing anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist struggles 
in the forefront (Chapter Three). For example, Red Guard denunciations of the Soviet Union 
were largely influenced by the anti-revisionist line of the CCP rhetoric. Nationalism among 
those Red Guards and support for Mao's approach were linked, because Mao emphasised 
anti-imperialism as one of his defining ideas and characterising China as militantly anti-
imperialist. Foreign praise of Red Guards and the Cultural Revolution might also have 
promoted some Red Guards' enthusiasm for the "revolution." 
Secondly, there are clear contradictions within CCP rhetoric dealing with the idea of 
"world revolution." The CCP sought peaceful compromise with the "bourgeois" French 
government and "colonialist" Britain for reasons of security and interest. Compared to the 
CCP's harsh denunciations of imperialism and inflammatory words of encouragement to the 
"oppressed people" of the world, the CCP's neglect of the protest by the Somali people 
against the French government could be seen as a failure to live up to anti-imperialism. In the 
85 
same sense, the CCP's skilful policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the British government 
over Hong Kong throughout the 1960s could be called "revisionist", Even in the summer of 
1967 when violent demonstrations by Chinese radicals against the British Charge d'Affaires 
office in Beijing reached their peak, the CCP general line in relation to Hong Kong remained 
moderate. Indeed, CCP rhetoric developed in the direction of calming down the anti-
colonialist movement. 
Thirdly, the CCP reluctance to act also contradicted its militant rhetoric. This was 
discussed in the second section of chapter one when looking at Chinese reaction to the 
Vietnam War. In response to Soviet "revisionist" attitudes towards the United States over the 
Vietnam War, China emphasised its militancy against imperialism even more strongly. 
However, China did not act as militantly as it advocated. Beijing appeared to portray a 
revolutionary image of China through rhetorical struggle against US imperialism. This 
meant that China did not want actual war in pursuing its anti-imperialist policy, while it was 
insisting on thorough violent struggles against the enemy by local national liberation 
movements. 
Fourthly, CCP revolutionary rhetoric throughout the 1960s revealed Chinese concern 
over the relationship with the Soviet Union. China regarded itself as a power that could 
challenge the Soviet leadership in the socialist camp. Beijing often tried to demonstrate its 
"orthodox" Marxism-Leninism by criticising Moscow's "betrayal," especially after 1964. In 
addition, China acted differently from the USSR -- for instance, China did not send its 
military troops abroad, while the Soviet Union did (Chapter One). It was also concerned 
with promoting an anti-Sovie_t united front around the world. 
On the other hand, the CCP's confidence in developing its influence on "Third 
World" revolutions seemed to wane in the latter part of the 1960s. Maoist China's relative 
isolation in the world which it portrayed as divided between the forces of imperialism and 
revisionism was accompanied by militant rhetorical strategies (Chapter Three). To Beijing, 
Mao and Mao Zedong Thought were "revolutionary banners" which China could impress the 
rest of the world with. 
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